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THE RIGHT TO AVOID TRIAL: JUSTIFYING
FEDERAL COURT INTERVENTION INTO
ONGOING STATE COURT
PROCEEDINGS
MICHAEL G. COLLINSt

State courts are presumed to be competent to decide questions of
federal law; consequently, federal courts are ordinarily not allowed to
intervene in state court proceedingseither collaterallyor on direct review
while they are stillpending. Exceptions to the generalrules of noninterference do exist, however. In this Article, Professor Collins examines
these exceptions to various statutory and judicially-creatednoninterference rules. He argues that these exceptions are not isolated in nature,
but are unified by a concern for the adequacy of stateforums to protect
againstirreparableharm to federal interests despite the usualpresumption ofparity. ProfessorCollinsfurther arguesthat the exceptions to the
noninterference rules are consistent with the basic policies underlying
the rules themselves. Concluding that considerableoverlap exists among
the exceptions, the Article offers a theory of "extraordinary circumstances" thatpreserves a limited rolefor federal court intervention and
that is consistent with the presumption ofparity.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Federal court intervention into ongoing state judicial proceedings is not an
everyday event.' Congressional and judge-made jurisdictional rules ordinarily
prevent federal court input into state court adjudication until after its conclusion. The Anti-Injunction Act, 2 judicially developed abstention doctrines, 3 and
t Associate Professor of Law, Tulane University. B.A. 1972, Pomona College; M.A. 1975,
Stanford University; J.D. 1978, Harvard University. I would like to thank Nelea Absher, Ruth
Colker, John Dzienkowski, Catherine Hancock, Douglas Laycock, Martin Redish, and Ann Woolhandler for their comments on earlier drafts.
1. The subject, however, figures prominently in many of the United States Supreme Court's
most recent decisions. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987) (reversing
injunction imposed by federal district court that prevented plaintiff, who prevailed in state court,
from executing judgment in its favor pending appeal to state appellate court); Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, 107 S.Ct. 989 (1987) (allowing Supreme Court intervention into ongoing state criminal
proceedings); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986)
(denying federal injunction against ongoing state agency enforcement proceeding); Parsons Steel,
Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518 (1986) (reversing injunction that halted ongoing state civil
proceedings); see also Deakins v. Monaghan, 798 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1986) (federal trial court interference with ongoing state grand jury proceedings), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 946 (1987).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982) (banning federal court injunctions against state court proceedings);
cf.Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982) (denying federal district courts the power to enjoin operation of public utility rates); Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) (denying federal district
courts the power to enjoin assessment, levy, or collection of state taxes).
3. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (equitable restraint); Railroad Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (abstention).
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the exhaustion requirement for federal habeas corpus 4 provide the most familiar
examples of noninterference rules. The narrow scope of removal for federal

question cases filed in state court5 and the requirement of a final judgment prior
to United States Supreme Court review of state court decisions 6 further restrict
immediate federal interference. Taken together, the noninterference rules often
make state courts the initial and, as a practical matter, the final arbiter of many
questions of federal law and related facts.
Congress, of course, has enacted other statutes that would seem to provide

an avenue for prompt vindication of federal rights and the resolution of federal
issues in federal court.7 Despite such statutes, the noninterference rules allow
state judicial systems a free hand in resolving disputes over which they have
asserted jurisdiction-even though federal law may provide a complete defense
to the state law claim, and even though suits raising the same issues might be

brought in federal court. 8 Some noninterference rules allow federal litigation to
proceed simultaneously with state court proceedings and simply bar federal

courts from enjoining them. 9 Other noninterference rules, however, bar litigants
from pursuing parallel federal court litigation altogether, thus ensuring that
state courts will exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of federal courts. 10
4. See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886) (requiring federal habeas applicants in custody
prior to judgment to exhaust state court remedies); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982) (requiring federal
habeas applicant in custody pursuant to state court judgment to exhaust state court remedies before
case can be heard in federal court).
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982) (limiting federal question removal to cases that could have
been filed in federal court originally); infra note 8; cf.28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1982) (civil rights removal),
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(1)-(3) (1982) (providing for Supreme Court review of final judgments
from state court); cf.28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) (providing for review of final decisions from federal
district court to federal appeals court).
7. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (granting general federal question jurisdiction to federal
district courts); id. § 1343(a)(3) (1982) (granting federal district courts jurisdiction over constitutional and civil rights claims).
8. Removal from state court on federal question grounds is not an option when the federal
issues arise only by way of defense to a claim based on state law; it is limited to civil suits that could
have been filed originally in federal court, consistent with the "well-pleaded complaint rule." See
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) (discussing effect
of pleading rules for original federal question jurisdiction on removal). See generally Collins, The
Unhappy History of FederalQuestion Removal, 71 IOWA L. REV.717 (1986) (discussing impact of
well-pleaded complaint rule on removal).
9. Parallel litigation in the state and federal courts may occur when the state suit is not removable and federal jurisdiction exists over a suit raising the same issues, but neither system defersto or
enjoins the other. Prohibitions such as that contained in the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1982), which bars federal injunctions against ongoing state judicial proceedings, contemplate that
both the state and federal court systems may proceed independently, without interference from the
other. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970); cf.
Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408,412-413 (1964) (state courts ordinarily cannot enjoin party
from prosecuting action in federal district court).
10. Some noninterference rules, such as the doctrine of equitable restraint, do more than prohibit federal courts from shutting down state judicial proceedings; they require the federal courts not
to proceed at all when a potentially preclusive federal judgment might "interfere" with the state
court's resolution of federal issues in suits over which it has obtained jurisdiction. See Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1971) (applying equitable restraint doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971), to bar declaratory relief); cf. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S.
293, 299-301 (1943) (doctrine of comity prohibits declaratory relief that would interfere with state
tax collection efforts). To this extent such noninterference rules cut against the presumption of
parallel litigation of issues in both systems. See supra note 9.
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The noninterference rules rest on the underlying presumption that state
courts ordinarily are just as competent at deciding federal questions and related
facts in the first instance as are federal courts.II Although this presumption of
parity of the state courts is hotly debated by commentators, 12 it is firmly entrenched in the various noninterference doctrines. These doctrines rely on the
ability of state court corrective process to police violations of federal law during
trial and to catch trial court errors on appeal. They also rely on post-trial federal review to check for federal errors after the state court system has finished
with the case.
The noninterference rules and the presumption of parity on which they rest
are propelled by a strong sense of deference to ongoing state court decision
making in our federal system. 13 In addition to such comity concerns, the interest in efficient judicial administration may favor letting state courts handle suits
based on state law that have been filed in state court, and in which federal questions arise only by way of defense or reply. Weighing against the usual presumption of parity and the interest in resolving disputes efficiently in state court,
however, is the judicial system's interest in accurate dispute resolution. In a
system in which federal issues must be decided, this interest in correct decision
making focuses on the proper construction and application of federal law and
the accurate finding of facts bearing on federal rights. One manifestation of this
interest is the usual availability of a federal forum at some stage of the litigation
to give uniform answers to federal questions and to safeguard federally protected
interests. Direct review in the Supreme Court is possible in state court cases
raising federal questions, and collateral review often is available in criminal
cases.14 The availability of such federal corrective process itself may act as a
guarantee of state court parity. 15 Thus, the competing concerns for accurate
and efficient dispute resolution are roughly accommodated by current noninterference rules, given the presumption of state court parity and the usual possibility of a posttrial federal forum.
Despite the normal presumption of parity, however, the noninterference
rules are not absolute, and there are notable "exceptions" to each of them. The
Court has made clear that interference with state court proceedings is sometimes
allowable while the state proceedings are still pending, either through injunc11. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976) (Court "unwilling to assume
that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and
appellate courts of the several states"); Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884) (state courts
have same duty to uphold Constitution and federal law).
12. Compare Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977) (rejecting presumption) with Bator, The State Courts and Federal ConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM. & MARY L.
REV.605 (1981) (embracing presumption).
13. See 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 67-68 (1978); Redish, The Doctrine of
Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 464-65 (1978).
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982) (appeal and certiorari); id. § 2254(a) (1982) (postconviction
habeas corpus).
15. Cf. Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword:ConstitutionalLimitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 40-41
(1981) (suggesting that state courts might neglect their "constitutional obligation" under the
supremacy clause if Congress should ever withdraw Supreme Court review of state court
judgments).
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tion, removal, pretrial habeas corpus, or early direct review in the Supreme
Court. These exceptions to the noninterference rules allow the federal courts to
interfere in ongoing state court litigation by effectively bringing it to a halt.
Although much attention has been given to the various noninterference rules
and their justifications, very little has been paid to their exceptions.t 6 The Court
usually treats the exceptions to the different noninterference rules separately.
Such treatment belies the fact that these exceptions are closely related to each
other and feed on similar concerns.
This Article illustrates the remarkable degree of overlap among the rationales for each of the diverse exceptions to the statutory and judge-made noninterference rules. The common thread connecting the exceptions is a concern
that the state forum adequately protect against the immediate and irreparable
loss of important federal interests. The noninterference rules and their exceptions reflect a judicial consensus that undergoing a state court proceeding, even
an erroneously instituted one, and having federal legal and factual questions decided there initially, ordinarily does not entail any irreversible loss of federal
rights. The "interlocutory harm" of incorrect decisions on federal issues is usually remediable, given the presumption of parity and the availability of subsequent state and federal corrective process. However, the mere commencement
or maintenance of state court proceedings can sometimes work an immediate
and independent injury to federally protectable interests that cannot be effectively remedied by posttrial review. Concerns about these potentially unreviewable interlocutory harms are the focus of all the exceptions.
This Article also seeks to demonstrate that the exceptions to the noninterference rules are consistent with the basic policies behind the noninterference
rules themselves. The Court allows immediate federal interference in those few
cases in which the supremacy of federal law and accuracy of decision making
substantially outweigh the powerful concerns for efficient dispute resolution and
comity that usually call for nonintervention. The strong presumption of state
court parity may be dispelled when the state system is procedurally unable to
provide adequate process for resolving federal issues. For example, ongoing
state judicial proceedings simply may not allow federal issues to be raised in a
sufficiently prompt manner, thus permitting immediate federal intervention. 1 7
Alternatively, the presumption of parity may be dispelled when continued litigation in the state courts would amount to a substantive injury under federal law.
16. The academic criticism and scholarship that surrounds each of these noninterference rules
is extensive, particularly the doctrine of equitable restraint outlined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971), but few efforts have been made to address them together. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Crinhal
ProsecutionsAffecting Federally GuaranteedRights: FederalRemoval and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793 (1965); Bator, supra note 12; Currie. The
Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (pt. 2), 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 311-19, 320-35
(1969); Maraist, FederalIntervention i State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski, Younger and
Beyond, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1324, 1332-38 (1972); Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers amtd the
Limits of the JudicialFunction, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984); Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985). The only attempt to treat any of the exceptions to these rules is Wingate, The Bad-FaithHarassmentException to the Younger Doctrine: Exploring the Empty Universe,
5 REV. OF LITIG. 123 (1986).

17. See infra text accompanying notes 98-101.
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For example, appellate process or postconviction collateral attack would do little to vindicate a state court litigant's colorable defense to a prosecution based
on double jeopardy grounds-a defense that the Court has characterized as a
right not to undergo additional trial proceedings at all.1 8 Such a claim has,
therefore, justified pretrial habeas corpus, 19 an injunction against state court
proceedings, 20 and immediate direct review in the Supreme Court under a liberalized reading of the final judgment rule. 21 In cases based on this paradigm,
state court corrective process is not only inadequate as a solution for protecting
federal interests, it is part of the problem.
Finally, this Article concludes that many of the state court cases giving rise
to an exception to one of the noninterference rules can also trigger the applicability of exceptions to the others. Thus, there may be significant overlap among
the available forms of immediate federal district court intervention- injunctive
relief, removal, or pretrial habeas corpus-given the existence of unusual circumstances warranting prompt federal court action. 22 In addition, there often
may be an overlap between the availability of immediate direct review in the
Supreme Court before trial under a liberalized doctrine of finality and immediate
collateral interference by a federal trial court. 23 In the direct review context,

however, problems arise. Once a state court lawsuit is ripe for appellate intervention following a final judgment, the Supreme Court alone may have jurisdic-

tion, to the exclusion of the lower federal courts. 24 This Article, therefore,
suggests the directions in which litigants should be able to turn when faced with
state court litigation warranting prompt federal court intervention. 2 5
Most writing in this area has been based on the premise that the noninterference rules, as construed by the Court, are undesirable obstacles to the vindication of federal rights. 26 Although such arguments are compelling, this Article
does not attempt to enter into that well-worn debate. Rather, it operates within
18. See, eg., Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659-62 (1977) (upholding intervention of
federal appeals court after district court failed to dismiss case on double jeopardy grounds); Harris v.
Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 56-57 (1971) (per curiam) (upholding Supreme Court intervention after
state courts failed to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds); cf. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331
(1970) (upholding defendant's right not to be subjected to double jeopardy.)
19. See, e.g., Gully v. Kunzman, 592 F.2d 283, 287 & n.8 (6th Cir.) (approving federal adjudication of pretrial habeas when state trial court has heard and rejected double jeopardy claim), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 924 (1979); Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218, 221-24 (5th Cir. 1973) (approving federal
adjudication of pretrial habeas when juvenile has been kept in custody to avoid facing adult charges
for same crime), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975).
20. See Willhauck v. Flanagan, 448 U.S. 1323, 1325 (Brennan, Circuit Justice 1980) (dictum);
Doe v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 42, 44 (1st Cir. 1984).
21. See Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 106 S. Ct. 1745, 1748 n.4 (1986); cf. Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 657-61 (1977) (pretrial denial of motion to quash indictment on double jeopardy
grounds held immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982), and under collateral order
doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 135-46, 178-80 & 224-27.
23. See infra text accompanying note 262.
24. See infra text accompanying note 263.
25. See hifra text accompanying notes 264-89.
26. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 16; Laycock, FederalInterference with State Prosecutions:
The Cases Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 636 (1979); Redish, supra note 16; Soifer &
MacGill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEX. L. REv. 1141 (1977).
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the Court's own framework. It accepts, for purposes of discussion, the usual
presumption of state court parity and the Supreme Court's role in the development of noninterference rules. The object of this Article is to develop the con-

tours and limits of the Court's common-law

approach

to judicial

noninterference, and to ascertain whether there is any coherent principle within
that framework that nevertheless justifies federal court intervention into ongoing
state court proceedings. Moreover, by treating the exceptions to the various

noninterference rules as a group of related remedies with a similar purpose, the
availability of intervention can be made less uncertain and the mode of possible
intervention more predictable.
II.

THE YOUNGER DOCTRINE OF "OUR FEDERALISM" AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF BEING ADEQUATE

Perhaps the most notorious limitation on federal court interference into
ongoing state proceedings is the equitable restraint doctrine of Younger v. Harris .27 Relying on principles of equity, comity, and federalism, the United States

Supreme Court in Younger held that federal courts ordinarily should not enjoin
ongoing state criminal proceedings, even when the state court action is based on
an unconstitutional statute. Federal intervention into a state criminal proceeding is permitted only if there is a "showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other
unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief."'2 8 Younger requires
state court criminal defendants to raise their constitutional claims as a defense to
the state proceedings, subject to ultimate review by the Supreme Court. Also,
state court defendants in certain ongoing civil proceedings are now subject to
29
this nonintervention rule.
27. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Another familiar brand of abstention is associated with Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). There the Court concluded that when litigants attack
state statutes on federal constitutional grounds, the state courts should be given the first chance to
resolve unclear questions of state law that would dispose of those constitutional issues. The desirability of having state courts construe state law in order for federal courts to avoid reaching constitutional questions, however, does not usually implicate federal noninterference with an ongoing state
proceeding. See Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for Prospective
Relief, 1977 Sup. Cr. REV. 193, 226-27. Under Pullman, federal litigants ordinarily must commence state proceedings after the federal suit has been filed. See 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4242, at 453 (1978). Of course, Pullman abstention conceivably could arise when there is an already pending state court proceeding in which the
unclear questions of state law could be presented. In that situation Pullman would resemble a principle of noninterference with an ongoing proceeding such as those discussed here. Nevertheless, if
irreparable harms arise in such contexts or in other abstention contexts, they can be policed in much
the same way as under the exceptions to Younger, discussed in this Article. See generally Wells,
PreliminaryInjunctions and Abstention: Some Problems in Federalism, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 65
(1977) (discussing availability of interim federal district court relief in context of Pullman
abstention).
28. Younger, 401 U.S. at 54.
29. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519, 1526-27 (1987) (private enforcement
of postjudgment lien and bond provisions in state court); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432-37 (1982) (state bar disciplinary proceedings): Trainor v.
Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 445-46 & n.8 (1977) (garnishment proceeding brought by state officers in
aid of administering welfare programs); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1977) (contempt action to enforce previously entered default judgment in private debt collection case); Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) (nuisance proceeding "inaid of and closely related to" crimi-
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Younger operates as a judge-made limitation on the congressionally conferred option that otherwise permits litigants challenging unconstitutional state
action to go directly to federal court to seek injunctive relief. That general rule,
illustrated by Exparte Young,3 0 still permits anticipatory injunctions in advance
of any state court proceedings to prevent the judicial enforcement of unconstitutional state statutes by state officials. Younger's applicability, therefore, often
3
will turn on the timing of federal relief. '
A primary justification for Younger's nonintervention rule is that the "cost,
anxiety, and inconvenience" 32 of undergoing good faith judicial proceedings
usually does not amount to irreparable harm sufficient to warrant enjoining
them. Dispute resolution strongly favors letting good faith litigants-particularly the state or its proxy-have their day in court. That is why the inconvenience of involuntarily being haled into court and undergoing an unwanted
lawsuit ordinarily is not a harm society is prepared to correct by the drastic
remedy of interference in the middle of litigation. 33 The possibility of raising
federal issues by defense supposedly obviates the need for federal equitable intervention.3 4 To be sure, the costs of going through a proceeding are "irreparable"
in the traditional sense of being noncompensable. 35 But Younger demands that
there be greater harm than the cost inevitably associated with undergoing good
faith litigation before declaratory or injunctive relief is allowed. Younger sugnal obscenity statutes). The extent to which Younger should apply to state court civil proceedings is
a much debated question. See generally infra note 144 (listing sources).
30. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
31. If there is no pending state proceeding when federal relief is sought, a federal suit does not
interfere with an ongoing proceeding, and Younger is inapplicable. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452, 460-62 (1974). If a state enforcement proceeding is filed after the federal suit, however,
"but before any proceedings of substance on the merits," the federal court can no longer proceed.
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975). Nevertheless, Hicks is only a problem for those who
have already violated the law inasmuch as a state proceeding cannot be brought against federal
plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of a law they have never violated. The federal
plaintiff in such a case may face "case and controversy" problems, however. See Steffel, 415 U.S. at
476 (Stewart, J.,concurring); cf Bator, supra note 12, at 616-18 & nn. 35-37 (noting problems of
abstractness when parties raise anticipatory challenges to constitutionality of state statute as applied
to future action).
32. Younger, 401 U.S. at 46.
33. Id.; accord Federal Trade Comm'n v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 244 (1980); Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209, 222 (1938); see also Renegotiation
Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974) ("Mere litigation expense, even substantial
and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury."); Cobbledick v. United States, 309
U.S. 323, 325 (1940) ("Bearing the discomfiture and cost of a prosecution for crime even by an
innocent person is one of the painful obligations of citizenship.").
34. Younger's "equity" prong is principally based on the tradition of equitable noninterference
into criminal proceedings and the rule that equity will not act whenever there is an adequate remedy
at law. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43; Whitten, FederalDeclaratoryand Injunctive Interference With
State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of JudicialDiscretion, 53 N.C.L. REV.
591, 597-616 (1975).
35. See, e.g., Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974) (noting that
litigation typically involves "nonrecoupable" expense). Under the "American Rule," litigants ordinarily must bear their own litigation and counsel costs, whether they win or lose. See Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (rule applies absent legislation to contrary). Recovery in tort for the harm of litigation generally is limited to cases of improper purpose in
the use of legal process. See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER
ANt) KtETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 124, at 897-98 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER &
KiFtETON] (discussing tort actions for abuse of process and malicious prosecution).
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gests that the kind of extraordinary, irreparable harm sufficient to trigger its
exceptions, and thus to allow federal interference into pending proceedings, only
arises when the state court system cannot fully and fairly protect against the loss
36
of federal rights.
Younger, however, leaves a number of questions unresolved. It fails to indicate, for example, when a particular state court remedy is inadequate, and why
state remedies are less adequate in the context of anticipatory, as opposed to
ongoing proceedings. It also is unclear how the concern for adequacy of state
remedies relates to Younger's articulated equity, comity, and federalism concerns. Some attempt to resolve these issues will assist in understanding the extraordinary circumstances that can warrant federal court intervention into
ongoing state proceedings.
A.

The Young-Younger Continuum
1. Equity

Younger's reliance on equity as a basis for its nonintervention rule has been
roundly criticized. 37 Equity's traditional reluctance to intervene in ongoing
criminal prosecutions is an incomplete argument for the Younger doctrine, because Younger bars interference with some civil proceedings as well. Also, equity's refusal to act when there is an adequate remedy at law does not fully
explain the Younger doctrine, because federal equity courts customarily considered only the legal remedies available in federal courts.3 8 Younger, however,
stretches this equity rule across jurisdictional lines by looking to adequate remedies in state proceedings. Only the vaguer concerns of comity and federalism
can explain federal court nonintervention into state civil proceedings and the
willingness to look to state court remedies.
These usual criticisms, however, do not mean that the Younger doctrine is
uninformed by equitable considerations, or that equitable concerns cannot help
to explain the relationship between Younger and Young. Younger continues to
allow litigants who have not yet violated an arguably unconstitutional statute to
enjoy Young's promise of a federal equity forum in which they may enjoin a
statute's enforcement in advance, assuming they can show a sufficiently "genuine threat" of its enforcement against them. 39 When there has been no violation
36. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977) (Younger not applicable absent "an opportunity fairly to pursue ...constitutional claims"); accord Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229, 237 (1984); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 436 n.14
(1982). Adequacy of remedy and irreparability of harm are two sides of the same coin insofar as an
adequate remedy is one that prevents irreparable harm, and a harm is reparable if there is an adequate remedy for it. See Whitten, supra note 34, at 601-02; Laycock, Injunctions and the Irreparable
Injury Rule (Book Review), 57 TEx. L. REV. 1065, 1070-71 (1979).
37. See, e.g., 0. Fiss, supra note 13, at 61-68; Wells, Why Professor Redish Is Wrong About
Abstention, 19 GA. L. REV. 1097, 1107-08, 1112-15 (1985).
38. See 0. Fiss,supra note 13, at 9, 63; cf.P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1009-10 (2d ed.

1973) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (observing that, prior to merger of law and equity, adequate
legal remedy that would bar federal equitable relief was not remedy in state courts, but remedy on
"law side" of federal court).
39. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974) (declaratory judgment action). Jus-
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of state law, there will be no ongoing state proceeding with which to interfere,
and equity's traditional reluctance to enjoin criminal proceedings is not fully
implicated. Also, equity's requirement that there be no adequate remedy at law
arguably is satisfied if there is no ongoing state proceeding in which to raise the
federal issues.
However, the difference in equity terms between interference with an ongoing state proceeding and interference with one that has not yet begun is but a
matter of degree. Federal litigants must satisfy traditional equitable prerequisites, including a showing of irreparable harm, to secure even anticipatory injunctive relief under Young. Nevertheless, those equitable requirements may be
easier to satisfy than Younger's requirement of irreparable harm "both great and
immediate."'40 In addition, parties seeking anticipatory relief are not wholly
without a remedy at law. They could test the law by violating it, and become
defendants to a state court proceeding in which they could raise their constitutional questions by defense. That, however, would put them in the classic equity
bind of having to choose between compliance with the law and possible loss of
constitutional rights, and violation of the law and risk of penalties.4 1 By contrast, state court defendants actually being prosecuted for past violations of the
challenged statute already have made the hard choice between compliance and
violation. Provided they do not intend to engage in similar conduct in the future, they no longer face the choice that equity is prepared to save them from
making. Raising the federal issue as a defense to state court proceedings is thus
42
an adequate legal remedy in the sense that it is not for the "pre-action" litigant
ticiability concerns, therefore, may be harder to satisfy in advance of a violation of the statute. See
id. at 476 (Stewart, J., concurring). Compare City of Houston v. Hill, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2508 n.7
(1987) (sufficiently genuine threat of enforcement) with City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,
105 (1983) (threat not shown).
40. Younger, 401 U.S. at 45-46 (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243 (1926)). But cf.
Steffel, 415 U.S. at 471-72 (traditional equitable prerequisites not required for declaratory relief).
Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Younger arguably meant to apply its "great and immediate"
harm rule to suits for federal injunctive relief when, as in Young, no prosecution was yet pending
against the federal plaintiff. Much of the precedent on which Younger relied, including Fenner (the
source of the "great and irreparable" harm rule), involved only prospective injunctions in the absence of any ongoing state proceeding. See Soifer & MacGill, supra note 26, at 1148-63. The same
was true of Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), in which an injunction was sought against
merely threatened proceedings. See Laycock, supra note 26, at 663-69; see also M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 295 (1980) (noting that
Dombrowski, if limited to injunctions against future prosecutions involving first amendment challenges, is "considerably narrower than Young"). Compare Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922,
931 (1975) (applying "traditional standard" for preliminary injunction against state law's enforcement when no pending prosecution against federal plaintiff) with Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,
712 (1977) (intimating that "exceptional circumstances" of Younger authorized permanent injunction even though no pending prosecution).
41. See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 392 (1948). One commentator refers to this
hard-choice predicament as the "Young dilemma." Laycock, supra note 26, at 641.
42. Pre-action litigants are ones who have not yet violated the law that they challenge. Postaction litigants (those who have violated the law) also have an anticipatory remedy if they are not
being prosecuted. If such federal plaintiffs seek anticipatory relief against a statute's enforcement
and have violated the statute in the past, they may seek federal relief respecting future prosecutions.
See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (declaratory judgment). But cf, Hicks v. Miranda, 422
U.S. 332, 349 (1975) (Younger triggered if state proceeding is commenced after filing of federal
lawsuit, but before proceedings of substance on the merits in federal court); Wells, supra note 37, at
1114-15 (observing that contrary to Hicks, equity ordinarily only would take into account adequate
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who can obtain a remedy only at the risk of violating the law.
Nevertheless, state court defendants wishing to engage in arguably protected conduct during the resolution of already pending charges against them for
similar conduct are still in Young's equity dilemma. They cannot know if their
conduct is protected until the state courts have finished with their case. Thus,
they risk further prosecution if they again violate the statute while the state
proceedings against their prior violations are still active. The Supreme Court,
however, has denied a federal trial forum to state court defendants who seek to
enjoin future, but not ongoing, prosecutions against them, because of the disruptive effect that any such federal court adjudication would have on the ongoing
state proceeding. 4 3 That interference would not be much greater than the practical interference arising from a simultaneous anticipatory attack in federal court
by parties who face a genuine threat of enforcement, but who are not being prosecuted-a form of interference the Court still permits. 44 Thus, even if Younger's
rule ordinarily makes sense, its application to future conduct of a defendant already in an ongoing proceeding does not.
In any event, supremacy concerns more strongly favor equitable intervention at the pre-action stage. A truly Draconian statute may so successfully chill
any would-be violator into compliance with the law that no challenge to it ever
would be attempted. Unless a litigant could bring an anticipatory attack, no
judicial review of such a law would ever take place. In this sense the state remedy also is inadequate. In addition, although equity's abhorrence of enjoining
criminal proceedings is implicated when injunctions are issued against anticipated as well as ongoing actions, 45 the harm is somewhat more diffuse in the
anticipatory suit context when no state court trial is yet underway.
legal remedies available at the time equity suit was filed). Law violators who have already been
prosecuted and sentenced for their past violations of a challenged statute also may seek anticipatory
relief against threatened future prosecutions. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 711-12 (1977).
43. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125-27 (1973) (because of interference that federal
judgment might have on pending prosecution, doctor being prosecuted for violating state law banning abortions could not seek prospective relief against future enforcement of statute) with Cline v.
Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 451-53 (1927) (allowing injunctive relief against future enforcement
of statute that formed the basis of then-pending state court enforcement proceeding against federal
plaintiff). See generally Laycock, supra note 27, at 204-07 (criticizing Younger's failure to allow for
prospective relief in such situations).
44. See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 929-30 (1975) (preliminary injunction
granted to two nightclubs complying with unconstitutional obscenity ordinance; Younger barred
relief to another similarly situated club that was being prosecuted for violating ordinance); Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974) (declaratory judgment granted to party who complied with
antitrespassing statute while cohort was prosecuted under same statute); see also infra note 48 (discussing potential impact on state proceeding). Once a prosecution is underway against someone who
has risked violations of the law, there is at least a chance that the question of unconstitutional state
action eventually will be reviewed by a federal court-either in the Supreme Court on direct review,
or collaterally on posttrial habeas corpus. Cf Laycock, supra note 26, at 665- 69 (noting obstacles to
eventual review). Younger gave short shrift to the argument, successfully made in Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-89 (1965), that the continuing chill to first amendment rights engendered
by prosecutions based on an overbroad statute was sufficient to warrant equitable relief. See
Younger, 401 U.S. at 50 (recharacterizing Dombrowski as a case of bad faith prosecution). But
Younger's rejection of the "chill" argument as a ground for injunctive relief in the context of pending prosecutions does not mean that the argument lacks force in the preprosecution context.
45. Even a purely prospective injunction under Young tells the state not to enforce its own laws
in its own courts. See Redish, supra note 13, at 475.
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2.

Comity (and Federalism)

Comity, which Younger dubbed a "more vital consideration" than equity, is
a principle of deference and "proper respect" for state governmental functions in
our federal system. 46 Although such concerns propelled the result in Younger,
which involved an ongoing state proceeding, they also are implicated in the anticipatory context. Injunctions under Young order a state's law enforcement
machinery to grind to a halt and effectively disable the state courts from processing state law claims.
When federal courts issue injunctions against merely threatened proceedings, however, principles of comity and federalism are less seriously affected
than when federal court injunctions interfere with a proceeding that is actually
pending. If there is a state court action already underway, a federal court lawsuit multiplies the proceedings and arguably casts doubt on the competence of
the state judiciary to decide federal issues with which it is presented. 47 Once the
state court suit has commenced, there is also a greater need for treating the state
court action as a single package on direct review (or postconviction collateral
attack) rather than carving out federal issues for immediate adjudication in federal court. State law or factual issues may render a decision on the federal questions unnecessary, or cast them in a different light. The main difference in
federalism and comity terms, however, is the high visibility of the federal court
disruption of a state proceeding by terminating a particular ongoing proceeding
as opposed to arresting one not yet commenced.
Nevertheless, similar impacts on comity and federalism interests can sometimes, if less frequently, arise in the anticipatory context. Injunction suits filed
by parties who are not being prosecuted may proceed in federal court alongside
the state court prosecution of others similarly situated, despite a comparable
potential for "insult" to the state judiciary. 48 Further, the visible affront of arresting an ongoing proceeding can arise in an anticipatory suit, as it did in
Young: if the enforcement officials decide to ignore the federal court's prospective injunction against the bringing of proceedings, the federal court may hold
49
the officials in contempt.
46. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
47. See Steffel v.Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974) (Younger's concerns have "little vitality"
in the no-prosecution-pending context).
48. See id. at 475 (plaintiff threatened with arrest could attack constitutionality of antitrespassing statute while arrested cohort faced prosecution for violating same statute). A comparable potential for interference in these cases exists because a federal suit by someone who is not being
prosecuted will draw the federal court into passing on the constitutionality of the state statute forming the basis of the ongoing state court proceeding. At the very least, this will have a practical
impact on the state court's decision on the constitutional question. Cf. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S.
66, 69-72 (1971) (Younger bars issuance of declaratory judgment on behalf of defendant in ongoing
state court enforcement proceeding because it would have a "'practical impact," if not preclusive
effect on ongoing proceedings).
49. Ex parte Young was a contempt proceeding brought against a state attorney general for
violating a lower federal court injunction against the enforcement of state rate regulations. 209 U.S.
123, 126 (1908).
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Harmonizing Young and Younger

Admittedly, Younger does imperfect service to the policies on which it purports to rest. It stands in open tension with Young and the policy that federal

courts should not refuse jurisdiction when Congress has conferred it.

0

Both

Younger and Young, however, implicate questions of equity, comity, and federalism, as well as the interests of the judicial system that feed those considerations.
The difference between their results can be partially explained by the fact that
the underlying concerns of the judicial system expressed in Younger are, in the

pre-action Young context, less drastically implicated. In addition, the interest in
accurate federal law decisionmaking weighs more heavily on the side of intervention in the pre-action context. Currently, Younger's analysis is largely, if not
wholly, informed by timing. Articulation of the reasons underlying that analysis

helps to delineate when the Court might find state remedies inadequate as a
general matter. The Younger analysis thus provides a framework for deciding
when, if ever, litigants might be able to establish the extraordinary circumstances sufficient to invoke the exceptions to Younger's noninterference rule,

even if the litigants are already embroiled in an ongoing state proceeding.
B.

Substantive Self-Correction Problems
Younger suggests that, despite its ordinary rule against interference, there

may be times when federal courts can intervene into already pending state court
enforcement proceedings. 51 Although equity, comity, and federalism are imperfectly served by Younger, these doctrines-along with the interest in efficient

dispute resolution and accurate decisionmaking-are the driving forces behind
the recognized exceptions to the Younger rule.
1. Bad Faith Prosecutions

The scope of Younger's "bad faith" exception is not altogether clear.
Although the Court has never found a bad faith proceeding since its decision in
Younger, it consistently has recognized that abstention would not be required in

such a case.5 2 The Court has linked bad faith both with prosecutorial "harass-

53
ment" and with the absence of any reasonable hope of success on the merits.

50. See Redish, supra note 16, at 78-79.
51. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
52. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 432 (1979); cf. Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 12426 (1975) (rejecting bad faith claim, although recognizing viability of bad faith claim as basis for
intervention). The Younger Court offered as an example of the bad faith exception its earlier decision in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), in which state proceedings had been brought and
were threatened with an eye toward deterring defendants' exercise of federal rights. 401 U.S. at 48.
See also Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 620-22 (1968) (refusing to find bad faith prosecution
despite allegations of improper motivation when there was some evidence to support charges); cf.
Gelpe, Exhaustion ofAdministrative Remedies: Lessons From Environmental Cases, 53 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 1, 47-48 (1984-85) (treating agency bad faith as exception to requirement of exhaustion of
administrative remedies).
53. Compare Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 621 (1968) (pre-Younger case in which Court
viewed bad faith prosecution as one "with no expectation of convictions but only to discourage
exercise of protected rights") with Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 126 n.6 (1975) (prosecution in
bad faith if brought "without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction"). Cf. Enochs
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Relying on these various characterizations, lower courts have on occasion found
bad faith sufficient to warrant federal injunctive relief against ongoing state proceedings when state actors have undertaken a prosecution because of the defendant's membership in a traditionally suspect class or have retaliated against the

exercise of a federally protected right. 54 This focus on discriminatory intent is
consistent with the modem equal protection analysis that these cases most
nearly resemble. 55 Some courts have found bad faith, absent discriminatory or
retaliatory animus, when the prosecution has been frivolous or undertaken with56
out any objectively reasonable hope of success.

There is, of course, a conflict between Younger's rationale and its bad faith

exception. 57 A prosecution without any objectively reasonable hope of success

presumably will not succeed, thus obviating the need for any federal intervention, either before or after trial. If state courts are presumed to be as capable as

federal courts at dismissing wholly bogus cases, a bad faith objection conceivably could be raised as a defense in the state court proceedings. Moreover, putting
the prosecution on trial in federal court by inquiring into prosecutorial motivation while the state proceeding is still pending raises substantial federalism and
58
comity concerns.

v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962) (noting in dictum that injunction could
issue againstfederal tax collection, despite anti-injunction command of 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (1982),
"if it is clear that under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail"). Harassment
is a kind of subjective bad faith, and thus should be a ground for intervention, quite apart from the
absence of any reasonable expectation of conviction. See Redish, supra note 13, at 473-74 n.98; cf.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND

FEDERAL COURTS § 1372(7), at 308-09 (1969) [hereinafter ALI STUDY] (allowing an injunction
when state law "plainly" cannot be constitutionally applied, or when enforcement is "plainly" discriminatory); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 118 n. 11(1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing ALI STUDY, § 1372(7), at 308-10, and distinguishing between harassment
and "no reasonable hope of conviction" as separate grounds for finding bad faith). But see Fiss,
Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1115 n.34 (1977) (arguing that harassment and bad faith invariably
are two sides of the same coin); cf. Maraist, FederalInjunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEX. L. REV. 535, 586 (1970) (viewing Cameron as a
motivation-plus-no-evidence test).
54. See, eg., Rowe v. Griffin, 676 F.2d 524, 525-26 (11th Cir. 1982); Heimbach v. Village of
Lyons, 597 F.2d 344, 346-47 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375,
1381-83 (5th Cir. 1979); Timmerman v. Brown, 528 F.2d 811, 815 (4th Cir. 1975); Shaw v. Garrison,
467 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972); Wichert v. Walter, 606 F. Supp. 1516,
1521-22 (D.N.J. 1985); see also Wingate, supra note 16, at 133-43 (discussing recent applications of
bad faith exception); Sedler, Dombrowski in the Wake of Younger, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 1, 29-42
(discussing early applications of bad faith exception).
55. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976); cf.Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.
598, 608 (1985) (in selective prosecution claims against federal officers, defendant must show discriminatory intent); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977) (discussing
burdens of proof in unconstitutional motivation cases).
56. See, e.g., Central Avenue News, Inc. v. City of Minot, 651 F.2d 565, 570 (8th Cir. 1981);
Fitzgerald v. Peek, 636 F.2d 943, 945 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 916 (1981); Pizzolato v. Perez,
524 F. Supp. 914, 921, 922 (E.D. La. 1981). However, in Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968),
a pre-Younger decision, the Court indicated bad faith could not be shown when the record was "not
totally devoid of support" for the prosecution's claim. Id. at 622.
57. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 13, at 473-74 & nn.67-70; Comment, Limiting the Younger
Doctrine: A Critique and Proposal, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1318, 1328 (1979). But cf. Maraist, supra
note 16, at 1340-42 (referring to bad faith prosecution as the "most appealing case for federal
intervention").
58. See Maraist, supra note 53, at 587; cf. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)
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In their concurrence to Younger, Justices Stewart and Harlan argued that

an injunction should lie against an ongoing bad faith prosecution, because "the
reasons of policy for deferring to state adjudication are outweighed by the injury
flowing from the very bringing of the state proceedings, by the perversion of the
very process that is supposed to provide vindication, and by the need for speedy
and effective action to protect federal rights."'5 9 According to this view, the

constitutional target warranting prompt federal action is not the unconstitutional statute on which a state court prosecution might be based; it is the bad

faith proceeding itself. A baseless prosecution runs afoul of due process; a retaliatory one violates equal protection. 60 Although the burden of undergoing a lawsuit ordinarily is not actionable, it can, like other ordinarily lawful burdens,
become actionable when it is distributed on an unconstitutional basis, such as

race, or in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Thus, under this rationale, a bad
faith prosecution should be actionable in federal court as a constitutional depri-

vation, even if the underlying statute on which it is based is not challenged. 6 1
Moreover, the injury to constitutionally protected interests caused by an

ongoing bad faith proceeding, no matter what the statutory basis, is a present
and largely irretrievable loss. The constitutional harm of which such defendants

complain is not simply a conviction under an illegal statute, but the harm of
enduring the enforcement proceeding itself. Subsequent corrective judicial process, either up the ladder of direct review or by postconviction collateral attack,
cannot effectively remedy that denial because it will have been complete by the
very maintenance and continuation of proceedings. 62 The state officer's intended retaliation or punishment can be perfected partly by the mere bringing of
charges; 63 the state proceedings become not only inadequate, but the very harm
(decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review; such an inquiry would "chill"
prosecutorial decisionmaking).
59. 401 U.S. at 56 (Stewart and Harlan, JJ., concurring); cf. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 153
(1908) (suggesting that mere filing of lawsuit may be an actual injury "equivalent in some cases to a
trespass").
60. See Currie, supra note 16, at 332; cf. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608-09 (1985)
("selective prosecution" by federal prosecutors violates Constitution if brought "because of" exercise of federally protected rights or because of other improper basis such as race or religion).
61. See, eg., Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 118 n.11 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); see also Sedler, supra note 54, at 40 n. 227 ("Where bad faith is established
... it does not matter if the underlying law is constitutional."); Whitten, supra note 34, at 636 &
n.185.
62. But cf.United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 268 (1982) (per curiam)
(concluding that claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness in recharging federal criminal defendant in
violation of due process can be vindicated on posttrial appeal from a final judgment of federal district
court); Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619, 622 (1981) (per curiam) (concluding that claim of selective and
discriminatory prosecution of state defendant in violation of equal protection clause can be vindicated on Supreme Court review from final judgment following trial). See also infra text accompanying notes 257-58 (discussing Flynt).
63. This is more likely to happen in those cases in which the prosecution is being used for an
improper purpose than those in which it is objectively frivolous, although a frivolous suit may itself
reflect subjective bad faith. See supra note 53. Thus, immediate review may be more compelling in
the bad intent cases. A similar dichotomy exists in ordinary tort law. A "malicious prosecution"
suit attacks the substantive baselessness of court proceedings, but must be brought after the initial
litigation is completed. An "abuse of process" suit attacks the impermissible purpose for which
litigation has been brought, but does not have to await the conclusion of the challenged proceedings.
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 35, at 897-98.
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to be avoided. A constitutional claim of bad faith, therefore, is more than an
ordinary dispositive federal defense; it is a defense to enduring further proceedings altogether.
As noted above, there is not a complete absence of corrective process in the
state court system to remedy a bad faith prosecution. 64 For example, a posttrial
damage action might provide a limited form of remedy. But the damage calculation in such cases may be speculative, and juries may not value the loss accurately. 65 Also, personal immunities of prosecutors who bring the state's cases
would make a subsequent damage remedy impractical. 66 Thus, the justification
for equitable relief may flow from the unavailability or uncertainty of monetary
relief against these otherwise immune state actors. 67 Similarly, although prevailing on appeal may be a sufficient remedy to the criminal charges, it is not a
complete remedy to redress the loss inflicted on valuable federal rights by the
state judicial system. 68 Nor can appeal remedy the ability of the bad faith prosecution to stifle protected activity pending the outcome of state process if the
prosecution has been brought purposefully to retaliate against or deter protected
activity. Moreover, given the usual deference accorded initial factfinders both
on direct and on posttrial collateral review, appeal may be a wholly ineffective
remedy to the criminal proceeding. Reversal may also result for reasons unre69
lated to the bad faith claim, thus insulating the issue of bad faith from review.
Because the constitutional injury lies in the very act of undergoing the state
prosecution, the absence of review would result in a constitutional wrong remaining effectively unremedied.
Although posttrial relief might be ineffective, a state court defendant conceivably could raise the bad faith issue in the ongoing state court proceedings
before trial by a motion to quash the indictment or dismiss the suit.70 But even
this remedy, assuming it were available, could be incomplete. What happens, for
example, if the state court wrongfully denies the motion to dismiss on bad faith
grounds? The defendants will then be forced to undergo proceedings that they
have a right to avoid completely. Also, it may not always be possible to seek
64. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
65. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 164 (1908) (indicating that complex constitutional fact
issues may be beyond jury's comprehension); cf.Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 106
S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (1986) (denying noncompensatory monetary recovery for "inherent" value of constitutional rights); see generally 0. Fiss, supra note 13, at 74-80 (noting difficulties of preferring
monetary to injunctive relief in civil rights litigation).
66. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976) (absolute personal immunity for prosecutors from civil damages liability respecting decision to prosecute). But cf. Pembaur v. Cincinnati,
106 S. Ct. 1292, 1298-99 & n.2 (1986) (county prosecutor's instruction to local law enforcement
officials may constitute "policy" sufficient to impose municipal liability for prosecutor's unconstitutional acts under Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), without regard to
possible personal immunities of prosecutor).
67. See Woolhandler, Patternsof Official Immunity andAccountability, 37 CASE W. RES. 396,
419-21 (1987).
68. See Laycock, supra note 27, at 197-202.
69. Laycock, supra note 27, at 200.
70. Exhaustion of state remedies ordinarily is not a prerequisite to a suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982). See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 507 (1982). But Younger, if applicable,
imposes an exhaustion-like requirement, which applies to trial proceedings as well as to state court
appellate review. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 n.22 (1975).
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relief from a federal trial court after exposing the bad faith issue to the state

court because of preclusion problems. 7 1 The state trial court's decision might be

subject to immediate interlocutory appeal within the state system, but even if it
is, the trial court's decision simply may be affirmed. At that point, under a broad

reading of the final judgment statute, state court defendants arguably would be
able to seek immediate Supreme Court review. 72 If that is the only available

avenue, however, the federal trial forum has been completely eliminated. Dispositive issues threatening irreparable harm to federal rights will have been
channeled into a distant and uncertain federal forum. These difficult preliminary
issues confront any suggestion that extraordinary circumstance defenses such as
73
bad faith be preliminarily submitted to the state courts.

In addition, despite the usual strong presumption of parity, the state judiciary may not be in the best position to judge its own structural failings or the
good faith of the quasi-judicial officers who initiate proceedings. 74 Certainly not
every constitutional harm about to be inflicted by the state judicial system, par-

ticularly one that arises during trial on a case-by-case basis, can or should be
policed by immediate federal trial court intervention. Yet failings of a constitutional dimension that go to the fundamental fairness of the process, that are

resolvable prior to trial, and that implicate the decision to prosecute-failings
that state courts might be especially reluctant to police-are of a different order. 75 Asking the state judiciary to pass on prosecutorial bad faith may not be as

impossible a task as asking the state judiciary to pass on its own fairness or selfinterest. 76 However, requiring state judges to decide the motivation of a prose-

cutor who acts in a quasi-judicial capacity in bringing the very litigation that is
before their court is much closer to that task than when the judiciary is asked to
test the constitutionality of legislative or executive action. 77 Pretrial corrective
process in state court may, therefore, be a less adequate remedy to the harm

inflicted by a bad faith prosecution than it is against other constitutional
harms.

78

71. But see infra text accompanying notes 257-59.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 265-67.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 268-70.
74. But cf. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1722 (1986) (state violates equal protection
clause when prosecutor intentionally discriminates on basis of race in striking individual jurors).
75. An analogous inquiry into the extent that constitutional error may have affected the courts'
truth-finding function is undertaken in deciding whether relitigation should be allowed on postconviction collateral attack on federal habeas corpus. Compare Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494
(1976) (full and fair opportunity to litigate search and seizure claim in state court precludes federal
habeas relief) with Kimmelman v. Morrison, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 2585-86 (1986) (allowing relitigation
of competence of counsel claim).
76. See Redish & Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of ProceduralDue Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 492-503 (1986); infra text accompanying notes 102-04.
77. Only to the extent that bad faith is premised on illicit motive, however, will the state court
have to make state-of-mind inquiries. See supra note 53.
78. Perhaps a litigant could be required to file a separate suit in state court to enjoin the state
proceedings. See Whitten, supra note 34, at 678. Yet, even assuming that most states had such
procedures and that state judges would be willing to enjoin their fellow judges' criminal cases, the
suggestion is fraught with even more difficulty than a requirement of preliminary exhaustion of
remedies within a given proceeding. Equity, moreover, always looked to the adequacy of legal remedies, not other equitable remedies. Younger has never been thought to upset the long-standing prin-
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Finally, comity concerns are less strongly implicated when the state's misuse of its own judicial system is the alleged source of the constitutional injury.
Forcing involuntary litigants to pursue additional state court avenues, even untainted ones such as pretrial motions or interlocutory appeals, only compounds
the harm of being in state court. Such avenues are part of the very process
resulting from prosecutorial bad faith. Comity concerns also are diminished insofar as a dispositive defense such as bad faith is independent from and collateral
to the merits of any state law claims. Normally, the concern for prompt resolution of disputes and the need for adjudication of federal and state issues in a
single suit militate against immediate collateral interference that carves off dispositive federal issues for initial federal inspection. Those same concerns, however, actually favor prompt interference when the dispositive bad faith claim is
particularly strong. 79 These factors-the irretrievability of the loss suffered by
undergoing the proceedings, the deficiency of state court corrective process, and
the relaxed need for attending to comity concerns-provide the underlying rationale for the bad faith prosecution exception to Younger's noninterference
rule.
2.

Proceedings Violative of Other Federal Rights

In keeping with the bad faith paradigm, injunctive relief ought to be available whenever the mere maintenance of state proceedings would work an independent deprivation of federally protected interests that could not be
protected by subsequent appellate review. For example, an equally necessary if
not more compelling use of immediate federal intervention exists when a state
court defendant seeks to abort a proceeding that is being pressed in violation of
the double jeopardy clause. 80 As a constitutional matter, the harm of which the
ciple that parties need not first file a separate lawsuit in state court before seeking a remedy in federal
court; it merely requires them to raise federal defenses in any ongoing enforcement proceeding. See
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (federal remedy under § 1983 is "supplementary" to any
state court action that the federal plaintiff might be able to pursue), overruled in part on other
grounds by Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978). If state law
does not permit a federal question to be raised by defense in an ongoing lawsuit, thus necessitating a
separate proceeding to test that question, Congress has granted the litigant the option of choosing
the federal forum at that point. Cf. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105-06
& n.2 (1944) (no "plain, speedy, and efficient" remedy in state court proceeding within meaning of
Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982), even though separate state court suit for a declaratory judgment could have been filed). "The Younger doctrine has so far been limited to situations where, in
the Court's view, the federal claimant is not entitled to become a plaintiff at all, because he has an
adequate remedy as a defendant." Laycock, supra note 27, at 199.
The uncertainty, if not futility, of attacking one state trial court's refusal to hear federal issues in
another state trial court has never been an adequate remedy in analogous contexts. See infra note
106. The adequacy inquiry has, therefore, traditionally been limited to consideration of the unextraordinary procedures available in the very proceedings that are pending against the would-be federal litigant. See also Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 425 & n.9 (1979) (state court counterclaim device
was sufficient opportunity to raise due process challenge to state proceedings).
79. The concern for probability of success on the merits is a consideration that goes into the
calculus for preliminary injunctive relief, and is thus always an extra check on the precipitous invocation of Younger's bad faith exception. See 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2948, at 430-31, 449-55 (1973); see also Leubsdorf, The Standardfor Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 544-48, 555-56 (1978) (discussing likelihood of success as
factor in award of interim injunctive relief).
80. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Willhauck v. Flanagan, 448 U.S. 1323, 1325 (1980) (Brennan,
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defendant complains is having to undergo a second trial, rather than a right to

be free from conviction after a second run-through. 8' The harm in this case, like
the harm of a bad faith proceeding, cannot be vindicated by subsequent corrective process. The postdeprivation remedy is too little and too late. For this

reason and regardless of whether the legal issue is a close call or whether the
prosecutor is acting in utter good faith, federal intervention is immediately
82
appropriate.
As the double jeopardy claim suggests, Younger also should not be an ob-

stacle to federal court interference if other substantively guaranteed federal interests necessarily would be impaired by the mere maintenance of a prosecution,
even one in good faith. In Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian
Schools,83 for example, a defendant in a state agency enforcement proceeding
claimed a first amendment right to be free from the agency investigation altogether. A similar claim once was raised by a defendant to a state court criminal

proceeding who objected to holding trial on her sabbath. 8 4 The defendants in
both cases sought injunctive relief against the ongoing state proceedings, arguing
that the very maintenance of the proceedings constituted a violation of their first

amendment rights. Although neither of these federal plaintiffs may have been
correct on the merits of their constitutional claims, a federal district court
should have been able to provide the answer to the constitutional question in
those cases, Younger notwithstanding. Otherwise, the harm of undergoing a
Circuit Justice 1980) (noting that question was "an open one," but "that an exception to Younger for
double jeopardy claims may be appropriate"); see also Doe v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 42, 44 (Ist Cir.
1984) (finding exception to Younger); Allen v. Johnston, 575 F. Supp. 935, 938 (S.D. Iowa 1983)
(same).
81. See Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 106 S. Ct. 1745, 1748 n.4 (1986) (appealability from state court
to Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982)); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977)
(discussing double jeopardy clause in context of appealability from federal trial courts under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (1982)).
82. To be sure, pretrial disposition of the double jeopardy claim in state court is possible. However, after an adverse determination, problems of immediate federal review or intervention would
then arise just as in the bad faith context. See supra text accompanying notes 70-73.
83. 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986). The respondent school claimed a first amendment right to be free
from "the mere exercise of jurisdiction over it" by the state employment agency investigating the
school's hiring practices. Id. at 2724. Although the majority indicated that Younger barred interference because there was an opportunity to raise that challenge in the very proceedings the school was
undergoing in the state system, nevertheless, it additionally concluded that no first amendment interest was lost by the mere undergoing of state agency procedures. Id. However, if it were truly sufficient under Younger for the school to have the chance to raise the first amendment issue in the state
proceedings, the Court did not need to decide the first amendment question itself. Nevertheless, the
Court was right to do so. When a colorable substantive self-correction claim is made that the very
undergoing of state proceedings violates constitutional rights, the federal courts must answer the
substantive self-correction question itself, even if it decides that a procedural vehicle exists in the
state proceedings to raise that same issue. See id. at 2726 & n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring).
The school's argument that a state agency decision forcing it to reinstate a particular teacher
would also violate its religion clause rights could be answered by the school's ability to raise its first
amendment objections to reinstatement in the agency proceeding. Only after an order of reinstatement by the agency would federal district court relief be proper. See id.
84. See New Jersey v. Chesimard, 555 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc). Compare id. at 66-68
(Younger barred injunctive relief against state court trial of orthodox Muslim held on her sabbath,
despite colorable claim that undergoing trial on sabbath violated first amendment rights) with id. at
72-74 (Adams, J., dissenting) (extraordinary circumstances exception to Younger should have applied) and id. at 78 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) ("If the free exercise right ... is lost pendente lite it is
lost for all time.").
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proceeding that the Constitution arguably prohibits altogether would effectively
go uncorrected. As in the bad faith context, a mere opportunity to raise the
constitutional issue in state court is inadequate.
3. Patently Unconstitutional Statutes
Younger also left open the availability of an injunction against a proceeding
brought under a flagrantly unconstitutional statute. 85 Of course, state corrective
process is not completely lacking in these cases either. If the state statute is
patently unlawful, the state courts should have no difficulty invalidating the statute. Should the state courts persist in finding the statute constitutional, Supreme
Court review would be obligatory.8 6 The Court, moreover, seems reluctant to
87
add teeth to this exception.
Nevertheless, attempted enforcement of a patently unconstitutional statute
may reflect a lack of good faith by the officials seeking to enforce it or the
lawmakers who passed it.8 8 Although prosecutors are absolutely immune from
damage judgments for bringing and maintaining a prosecution, they are not immune from injunctive relief.8 9 Indeed, Younger suggests as much by holding
out the prospect of injunctions against prosecutions in exceptional circumstances. Allowing an exception to Younger when a prosecution is brought
against clearly protected activity gives the prosecutor only a qualified or objective good faith immunity 90 from such injunctive relief. Such an approach comports with the Court's suggestion that bad faith can be shown by the lack of any
reasonable expectation of success on the merits.9 1 In addition, as in the bad
faith context, prompt intervention rather than delayed appellate review may further dispute resolution concerns, because the strong likelihood of success should
be discernible from the face of the pleadings. 92
C.

ProceduralSelf-Correction Problems

State proceedings, therefore, may be inadequate for Younger purposes in a
substantive sense, when merely having to defend against them would effect an
independent, constitutional violation. In addition, they can be inadequate in a
more purely procedural sense, when the state system lacks effective process
85. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)). In
Watson, however, the issue was whether a federal court should refuse to abstain under the doctrine
of Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See supra note 27.
86. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1982) (allowing appeal of right when state statute's validity attacked on federal constitutional grounds and decision in state courts upholds statute's validity).
87. Because of the ease of finding federal law ambiguous or of hypothesizing some constitutional application of the state statute, this "exception" has received short shrift. See, e.g., Trainor v.
Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 446-47 (1977); id. at 461-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88. See Whitten, supra note 34, at 668-69.
89. See supra note 71; see also Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (officers performing judicial functions not immune from injunctive relief).
90. Cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982) (setting out requirements of objective
good faith immunity for executive officers in constitutional damage cases).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
92. See Comment, supra note 57, at 1329.
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either for raising federal questions or for correcting erroneous lower court answers to those questions. Procedural self-correction problems also are present
when the state allows federal issues to be raised and reviewed, but does not

provide for interlocutory relief that may be necessary to protect against interim
loss pending the state court litigation. 9 3 These procedural self-correction
problems mirror the concerns addressed in the Johnson Act 94 and the Tax Injunction Act. 95 Those provisions preclude even wholly prospective injunctive

relief by federal courts against state utility rate-making and tax collection efforts,
provided there are "plain, speedy and efficient" 96 remedies in the state courts to

raise legal attacks on them. Under those anti-injunction acts, federal intervention has been the norm when deficiencies in state procedure could work irreparable injury to a federally protected right. 97 The Younger doctrine seems to
incorporate a comparable set of limitations in the context of ongoing

proceedings.
1. Inability to Raise Federal Issues
The best example of a purely procedural inadequacy occurs when the state
system forbids raising the federal issue that requires a prompt decision in an
ongoing state court lawsuit. In Gerstein v. Pugh98 the Court upheld immediate
federal intervention to allow a party to litigate his constitutional right to avoid

pretrial detention by state officials without a probable cause hearing. The detainee's problem was that the ongoing harm of being incarcerated without a

hearing, before trial, could not be addressed in any presently ongoing state court
proceedings. 99

Comity concerns are less seriously affected when there is no pending judicial proceeding that is considering the same issues that the federal action would
consider. In addition, the constitutional harm in Gerstein was one that could
93. See cases cited infra note 97. In the criminal context, however, the Court has paid little
attention to the litigant who seeks interim prospective injunctive relief while a prosecution is pending. See Laycock, supra note 27 at 196-99.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
95. Id. § 1342(4).
96. Id. §§ 1341, 1342(4). On the relationship between the "plain, speedy and efficient" criteria
and general equitable considerations, see Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 524-25
(1981) (denying that former go as far as latter); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 38, at 979; Case
Comment, FederalInjunctive Relief in Tax Cases: LaSalle v. Rosewell, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1016,
1021-27 (1980).
97. See, e.g., Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104, 108 (1939) (lack of opportunity in state system to seek interim injunctive relief not "plain, speedy and efficient" remedy under
Johnson Act); Mountain States Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 299 U.S. 167, 170 (1936) (same);
Pacific Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196, 204-05 (1924) (absence of interlocutory stay machinery in state court system permits federal equitable intervention in proper case); see also infra notes
105 & 111 (discussing inadequate state remedies in context of habeas and procedural due process
claims).
98. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
99. See id. at 108 n.9; see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 380 n.5 (1978) (Younger not a
bar to suit challenging constitutionality of marriage statute when there was no currently ongoing
state court proceeding within which to raise issue); Monaghan v. Deakins, 798 F.2d 632, 637 (3d Cir.
1986) (Younger not a bar to suit for injunctive relief to recover document from state grand jury
proceeding when it was not possible at time federal suit was filed to seek such relief in ongoing state
proceedings), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 946 (1987).
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have been mooted before the ordinary avenues of self-correction could become
available. Going to trial would eliminate the detainee's problem by ending the
pretrial detention, but it would do so at the cost of nonreviewability. Moreover,
to the extent that the pretrial detention problem was systemic, the issue would

be crystallized and independent from the merits of any single criminal proceeding. Even from a dispute-resolution perspective, the lack of any opportunity
within ongoing state proceedings to litigate ripe federal issues also strongly
weighs in favor of prompt federal intervention. 100 Thus, when there is an actual

showing of the lack of self- corrective process and a harm that must be addressed
now or never, there is no parity in fact. 101
2. Tribunal Bias
The Supreme Court also allowed federal intervention into an ongoing state

optometry license revocation proceeding in Gibson v. Berryhill.102 The licensing
board's composition in that case violated due process because its members had a

financial incentive to revoke the licenses of competing optometrists like the federal plaintiff.10 3 Tribunal bias may be disclosed in the course of many proceed-

ings, and often can be policed on direct review after trial and state court

appeals. 104 However, like bad faith, systemic bias that goes to the integrity of
the truth-finding functions of the tribunal, and that may be raised in advance of
the state proceedings, is different. Such bias negates the presumption of state
court parity from the outset. When both the tribunal and the bringing of pro100. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 46. Another traditional use of equity was to guard against a
multiplicity of lawsuits. See Whitten, supra note 34, at 598-99. Younger itself seems to bow to that
tradition by noting the defendants in that case did not claim that they would be subject to "a series of
repeated prosecutions," and by observing the injury to federal interests had to be redressable in a
single proceeding. 401 U.S. at 49. If state law allowed for multiple enforcement proceedings in
which the federal defense would have to be raised repeatedly, or simultaneously in a host of forums,
this would be a procedural failing akin to the inability to have the federal issue decided at all. See
Ziegler, An Accommodation of the Younger Doctrine and the Duty of the FederalCourts to Enforce
ConstitutionalSafeguards in the State CriminalProcess, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 266, 302-03 (1976); cf.
Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 303 (1952) (state law requiring multiple
suits to be filed in state courts to obtain refund of unconstitutionally collected taxes does not constitute a "plain, speedy and efficient" remedy barring federal court interference under Tax Injunction
Act).
101. The Court has also said that even if it is not procedurally possible to adjudicate immediately
a federal claim in an ongoing enforcement proceeding, the possibility of eventual state court judicial
review in which the issue can be raised is sufficient for Younger purposes. See Ohio Civil Rights
Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2718, 2724 (1986). But cf. Monaghan v.
Deakins, 798 F.2d 632, 636-38 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1986) (because grand jury has "no opportunity to
adjudicate anything," Younger inapplicable to pre-indictment § 1983 suit to obtain return of allegedly unconstitutionally seized documents), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 946 (1987).
102. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
103. State law forbade the practice of optometry by anyone who was not self-employed. The
federal plaintiff worked for an out-of-state optical company, but the licensing board consisted of
members of a state optometric association made up entirely of independent practitioners. See id. at
566-68, 571; see also United Church of the Medical Center v. Medical Center Comm'n, 689 F.2d
693, 699-700 (7th Cir. 1982) (following Berryhill).
104. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 1580, 1584-87 (1986) (participation of state
supreme court justice with direct stake in outcome of case in which he cast deciding vote violated
due process). In Aetna Life, the bias was revealed only after the state supreme court had issued its
decision. Id. at 1584. The bias in Berryhill was apparent and ascertainable before the proceedings
and with only a minimal factual inquiry. See 411 U.S. at 571.
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ceedings are tainted, as in Berryhill, arguments for prompt federal court intervention are even stronger.
Moreover, in a case such as Berryhill there would have been no meaningful

opportunity to raise the federal issue before the administrative board, particularly an issue addressed to the tribunal's own fairness. As in the context of
posttrial habeas exhaustion, the abject futility of pursuing state remedies should

serve as a ground for immediate federal relief under Younger.10 5 More importantly, even though unbiased state appellate process was available in which to
press the bias claim in Berryhill,0 6 the federal plaintiff would have been denied

the benefit of his license and business income pending appellate review-an interlocutory harm that would be harder to remedy in a postdeprivation forum.
3.

Procedural Due Process Challenges to Ongoing State Judicial Proceedings
A separate and troublesome

category of procedural self-correction

problems arises when litigants mount a procedural due process challenge to the
ongoing state enforcement proceeding in which they are involved. 10 7 A strong
argument exists that a federal court always should be prepared in the first instance to assess the constitutional adequacy of such state proceedings.' 0 8 If the
105. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982) (postjudgment exhaustion excused for federal habeas when
"there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances
rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner"); see also Wilwording v.
Swenson, 404 U.S. 250 (1971) (per curiam) (exhaustion not required when it was "a matter of conjecture" whether petitioner's claims would have been heard in state court); Marino v. Ragen, 332
U.S. 561, 568 (1947) (per curiam) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (exhaustion unnecessary "when at the
outset a petitioner cannot intelligently select the proper way, and in conclusion he may find that
none of the [alternatives] is appropriate or effective"); Layton v. Carson, 479 F.2d 1275, 1276-77
(5th Cir. 1973) (exhaustion unnecessary "when it is plain that resort to the state courts would be
futile" because of entrenched decisional law); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 38, at 1489.
The Court, however, has indicated that the existence of some adverse state court precedent does
not render the state courts inadequate for Younger purposes. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332,
350 n. 18 (1975) ("state courts.., sometimes change their minds"); cf. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,
107 S. Ct. 1519, 1528 (1987) (noting burden rests on party seeking to obviate Younger to provide
"unambiguous authority" showing inadequacy of state remedies). Nevertheless, a few lower federal
courts have drawn the parallel between the futility doctrine of habeas and the exceptional circumstances rule of Younger. See, e.g., W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 491 (7th Cir.
1984) (Younger inapplicable when "adverse precedent [in state court system] makes the [state] remedies futile as a practical matter"); see also Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940, 943-44 (9th Cir. 1974)
(persistent state court rejection of or refusal to hear particular federal claim shows inadequacy for
Younger purposes); cf. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 446-49 (1965)
(futility of agency relief may also excuse a party from exhausting administrative remedies prior to
seeking judicial relief).
106. Appellate review from the board in Berryhill was de novo. See 411 U.S. at 577 n.16.
107. Compare Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977) (judicial asset disclosure proceedings
challenged by judgment-debtor as violative of procedural due process not enjoinable when constitutional challenge to adequacy could have been raised in proceedings prior to disclosure) with Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 71 n.3, 96-97 (1972) (prejudgment private attachment ancillary to later-filed
state court suit for breach of contract held enjoinable as violation of procedural due process) and
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 554-56 (1972) (summary prejudgment garnishment
ancillary to later-filed suit for nonpayment of debt held enjoinable as violation of procedural due
process).
108. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 469-70 & n.15 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(suggesting Younger is inapplicable, and federal court must decide the constitutional question, whenever challenge is to the "constitutionality of the state procedure itself"); Juidice, 430 U.S. at 340
(Stevens, J., concurring) (reaching question of whether challenged state procedures in judgmentdebtor proceeding were constitutionally adequate under due process clause, even though opportunity
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state court procedures are constitutionally deficient, there is arguably no full and
fair opportunity to raise that or any other federal issue in the state court.
Difficulty arises in these situations because "adequacy" operates at two
levels. State procedures may be constitutionally inadequate for purposes of effecting a deprivation if they do not comport with procedural due process, yet
they may be adequate for the purposes of Younger if they provide a full and fair
opportunity to raise the due process attack. 10 9 Frequently, of course, the opportunity to raise the procedural due process claim in the state proceedings also will
be lacking when the constitutional challenge itself goes to notice and hearing
deficiencies. The two adequacy questions-constitutional adequacy as opposed
to Younger adequacy-can thus collapse into each other. When they do, a federal court must be able to answer the constitutional question at the outset.
It is not inevitable, however, that a procedurally imperfect proceeding be an
inadequate one for Younger purposes.1 10 In procedural due process cases, the
constitutional harm is the eventual unlawful deprivation of liberty or property,
not, as in the bad faith and double jeopardy paradigms, the very undergoing of
state proceedings. Until an unconstitutional deprivation actually is effected or
imminently threatened, there is no irreparable injury. Simply undergoing a procedurally flawed action does not amount to an irreparable injury. Thus, when
the state proceedings are still at the predeprivation stage, and an opportunity
exists to raise the constitutional objection, 11' Younger properly may call for
noninterference. On the other hand, irreparable harm already may have commenced if the state court defendant is undergoing state process only after a deprivation has taken place. In that situation the federal forum should remain
open. 112
D. Looking for Full and FairProcedures
In sum, irreparable harm presupposes inadequate state remedies. The
search for adequacy under Younger always looks in two directions: state procedural mechanisms must be up to the task both of answering federal questions,
and more particularly, of policing against possible interim or interlocutory
to raise that issue may have existed in state proceedings); Soifer & MacGill, supra note 26, at 11951202, 1207-12; Wingate, supra note 16, at 139-43.
109. See Developments in the Law--Section 1983 and Federalism,90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 131822 (1977) [hereinafter Developments].
110. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 426 n.10 (1979) (attacks on procedural constitutionality
of state remedies do not "automatically" require federal intervention at the outset).
111. Compare Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519, 1528 (1987) (requiring "unambiguous authority" showing inadequacy of state remedies) with Hernandez v. Finley, 471 F. Supp. 516,
519 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (uncertain remedy is an inadequate one), aff'd sub nom. Quern v. Hernandez,
440 U.S. 951 (1979); cf. Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 76 (1976) (uncertainty as to how state
remedy is sought may not be "plain, speedy and efficient" under Tax Injunction Act); Township of
Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 625-26 (1946) ("uncertainty surrounding the adequacy of
the state remedy" lay in decisional law of state courts and in the fact that review to state supreme
court was only discretionary); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105-06 & n.2
(1944) ("uncertainty surrounding the adequacy of the [state] remedy" meant that remedy was not
"plain, speedy and efficient"). See also supra notes 97 & 105 (citing other examples of when an
opportunity to raise constitutional objection is lacking).
112. See Developments, supra note 109, at 1318-19.
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harms to federal interests that could not be effectively reviewed later. Even if
the state judicial system is replete with fair procedures for the raising of constitutional questions and guarding against interim loss of federal rights, the proce-

dures are nevertheless inadequate if having to resort to them would effect an
independent deprivation of constitutional dimensions. The mere opportunity to
raise federal issues in the state proceedings is not always an adequate remedy

when the involuntary litigant claims that enduring the proceedings itself produces the harm to be arrested.

Thus, when the argument for immediate federal interference is premised on
a substantive self-correction claim-the loss of a substantive right by virtue of
the mere continuation of the prosecution-the courts have not set up a requirement of "preliminary" exhaustion of immediately available state court reme-

dies.113 On the other hand, when the nature of the claim is based on the absence
of adequate procedural self- correction in the state court system, courts have

required exhaustion, but only after ascertaining that state remedies are not
14
clearly absent.'
III.

THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT AND ITS "EXPRESS" EXCEPTIONS

The Younger Court expressly borrowed its rationale from the congressional
policy underlying the Anti-Injunction Act. 1 15 The Act squarely commands fed-

eral courts not to stay criminal or civil suits filed in state court except in a few

specified circumstances.1 16 It reflects a preference for letting state courts resolve

disputes over which they have obtained jurisdiction, free from federal intervention by injunction.
Nevertheless, the Act produces some awkward results. Because state courts

ordinarily cannot enjoin federal court proceedings, 1 7 the command of the antisuit injunction statute means that parallel litigation may occur at the same time
113. In cases raising the bad faith exception, courts usually have not inquired into the existence
of available state court pretrial remedies by which the same question may be raised. See supra note
54. In cases raising double jeopardy claims, however, federal courts have sometimes made reference
to exhaustion of pretrial state remedies. See supra note 80. In cases alleging interference with other
substantive rights (such as religion clause claims) by going through trial, the results have been
mixed. See supra notes 83-84.
114. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 435 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335
(1977); Lynk v. LaPorte Super. Ct. No. 2, 789 F.2d 554, 568-69 (7th Cir. 1986).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982). See Younger, 401 U.S. at 54. In Younger, however, the Court left
open the question of the applicability of § 2283 to suits for injunctive relief against state court proceedings brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Younger, 401 U.S. at 54.
116. The Act provides: "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982). The first
version appeared in 1793. See Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334. The statute is thought to
embody a strong message of federalism and deference to state courts, although that understanding
has been the subject of recent criticism. See, e.g., Mayton, Ersatz Federalism Under the Anti-Injunction Statute, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 330 (1978); Comment, FederalCourtStays ofState Court Proceedings: A Re-examination of Original CongressionalIntent, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 612 (1971).
117. See Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964). See generally Arnold, State Power to
Enjoin FederalProceedings, 51 VA. L. REV. 59 (1965) (discussing history of state court efforts to
enjoin federal court proceedings).
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in both systems."1 8 The mere possibility that a state court could reach a preclu-

sive decision ahead of the federal court has never been enough to allow the fed-

eral court to enjoin parallel state proceedings "in aid of its jurisdiction." ' " 9 In
addition, the statutory language of section 2283 that permits a federal court to
stay state proceedings in order "to protect or effectuate its judgments" generally
has been limited to preventing state court relitigation of matters already decided
in federal court.120 However, by finding "expressly authorized" exceptions to
the Act in congressional statutes that neither mention section 2283 nor specifi-

cally refer to injunctions against state judicial proceedings, the Court has allowed federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings when federal law
effectively gives the litigant a right not to be tried in state court.
A.

From Express to Not-So-Express Exceptions

In Mitchum v. Foster121 the Court concluded that suits brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the descendant of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, were expressly au-

thorized exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act. Even though section 1983 lacks
any reference to the Anti-Injunction Act, the Court noted that the civil rights
statute grants federal courts the power to entertain suits in equity when a liti12 2
gant's federally protected rights have been denied under color of state law,

and also noted the civil rights statute's framers clearly contemplated that the
state judiciary might effect such a denial. 123 The Court reasoned that Congress

must have intended that an injunction would lie against state judicial proceedings in the proper case. 124 In order to satisfy the "expressly authorized" excep-

tion, the Mitchum Court concluded that the congressional statute "must [create]
a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a federal court of

equity, that could be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to enjoin a state court proceeding."' 125 Elsewhere the Court articulated its test as

requiring a congressional enactment that could "be given its intended scope only
by the stay of a state court proceeding."' 126 At a minimum, therefore, Mitchum

118. Absent one of the recognized forms of abstention, federal courts usually will not stay their
own hands in deference to a parallel state court proceeding. See Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19 (1983).
119. This is true at least for in personam, as opposed to in rem actions. See Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 294-96 (1970). For criticism of this aspect
of the Court's interpretation of § 2283, see Redish, The Anti-Zinunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U.
CHi. L. REv. 717, 753-760 (1977).
120. See, e.g., Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 524 (1986).
121. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
122. Id. at 226, 242.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 242. Mitchuin involved a challenge to a bad faith enforcement proceeding. Id. at
227.
125. Id. at 237.
126. Id. at 238. The Court also had other worries in Mitchum that contributed to its result. It
suggested that a contrary rule would have rendered its Younger decision unnecessary, a decision it
had issued only the previous Term. Id. at 231. The Court in Younger had assumed, without deciding, that the anti-suit injunction statute was not a bar to a federal suit under § 1983 that sought
injunctive relief against a pending state court proceeding. Younger, 401 U.S. at 54. The judicially
created noninterference principle developed in Younger operated above and beyond any statutory
bar to injunctive relief. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 230. Had the Mitchum Court decided that the Anti-
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means that in the rare case in which state judicial proceedings are themselves an

independent violation of section 1983, a federal court may enjoin them. 127

A scattered majority of the Court appeared to embrace reasoning similar to

Mitchum's a few years later in Vendo Co. v. Lektro- Vend Corp.1 28 Although the
issuance of an injunction against state court proceedings was reversed in that
case, six Justices agreed that section 16 of the Clayton Act 129 would present an
"express exception" to the Anti-Injunction Act.1 30 Four of those six were in
dissent, and concluded that an expressly authorized exception was made out
whenever: (1) the federal statute on which the federal court claim was based had

explicitly authorized injunctive relief; and (2) the bringing or maintenance of
judicial proceedings itself violated the statute. Using this two-step approach, the
dissenting Justices concluded that the state court proceedings against the federal
plaintiffs in Lektro-Vend were being employed as an anticompetitive device in

violation of federal antitrust laws, and would have upheld the issuance of an
injunction.131 Another two Justices joined the plurality in reversing the order of
injunction, but nevertheless agreed that section 16 was "an express exception

under narrowly limited circumstances" when state court lawsuits were being
used as an anticompetitive device. 132 They disagreed with the four dissenters

over whether an injunction of the state court proceedings was proper on the
facts of the case.

The basis for their disagreement was not altogether clear.133 Nevertheless,
a majority of the Court apparently agreed that an "expressly authorized" exception to the anti-suit injunction statute existed when the institution of state court
proceedings was forbidden by federal statute, provided the federal statute auInjunction Act itself barred interference into all ongoing state judicial proceedings whenever § 1983
was the basis for federal injunctive relief, the noninterference principle of Younger would have been
unnecessary. In addition, the Court stated that such a holding would have forced it to overrule
Younger to the extent that it had suggested federal intervention into ongoing state proceedings could
be appropriate in exceptional circumstances such as bad faith. Id. at 231. Therefore, although
Mitchum carved § 1983 suits out from under the statutory no-injunction rule, Younger remained to
impose a judge-made set of limits on injunctive relief under § 1983. See Weinberg, The New Judicial
Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1191, 1211-14 (1977).
127. In Mitchum, the Court clearly meant to remove the bar of§ 2283 in all suits under § 1983.
As argued below, however, the Court may not have needed to go so far. See infra text accompanying notes 136-41.
128. 433 U.S. 623 (1977).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982).
130. Lektro-Vend, 433 U.S. at 653-54 (Stevens, J.,dissenting); id. at 644 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
131. Id. at 663 & n.37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 644 (Blackmun, J., joined by Burger, C.J., concurring).
133. See Redish, supra note 119, at 740-42. The federal plaintiffs in Lektro-Vend argued that a
single "anticompetitive" prosecution of a civil suit in state court could violate the antitrust laws. At
some points the concurring opinion can be read to say that § 16 itself is violated only when there is a
concurring). If that is true, then the
pattern of such suits. See, e.g., 433 U.S. at 644 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring opinion adheres in principle to the basic Mitchum approach of the Lektro- Vend dissenters, even though the dissent concluded that a single suit of such a nature could violate the antitrust
laws. On the other hand, the concurring opinion could also be read to suggest that additional equitable considerations, beyond the two-step requirement articulated by the Lektro-Vend dissent, may
prevent the issuance of an injunction. See Redish, supra note 119, at 741. Professor Redish has
argued that this second approach would suggest a reading of the anti-suit injunction statute that is
somewhat narrower than the dissent's. See id. at 740-42.
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1
thorized the issuance of injunctive relief against violations of the statute.

34

The Mitchum/Lektro- Vend "expressly authorized" approach to the AntiInjunction Act dovetails with the "exceptional circumstances" doctrine of
Younger by allowing intervention into ongoing state proceedings. Under section
2283, as interpreted in these cases, federal courts may issue an injunction to stay
state court proceedings when those proceedings are violations of a federal statute
authorizing equitable relief. When federal law proscribes activity that can include the bringing or maintenance of state court lawsuits, and permits equitable
relief against it, Congress has in effect created an immediately enforceable right
not to endure the state court trial and subsequent corrective process-an
earmark of the bad faith and double jeopardy category of Younger exceptions. 135 Like Younger's extraordinary circumstances rule, this "defense" to the
state proceedings differs from an ordinary dispositive defense to the imposition
of liability: it is a defense to having to defend the proceedings altogether. In
both instances, subsequent corrective process in the state courts or the Supreme
Court on direct review cannot make up for the harm that attends undergoing
continued state court judicial process, which has been proscribed by Congress.
This exceptional circumstances approach to the Anti-Injunction Act can be
136
It
criticized for robbing the term "expressly authorized" of its plain meaning.
is not, however, wholly irreconcilable either with the language of section 2283 or
with its revisers' probable intent. 137 The express exception language seems to
call for a statute in which Congress has declared in so many words that the
Anti-Injuction Act is altogether inapplicable. But a statutory scheme may express a willingness to allow federal court injunctions of state court proceedings
in some cases, without having to exempt itself from the command of section
2283 in all cases. Thus, there may be a sufficiently clear statement from a congressional enactment, through ordinary principles of statutory interpretation,
that the statute authorizes injunctive relief and that state proceedings are among
the possible violations fairly reachable by the statute. If so, there is no reason to
second-guess the fair command of Congress, as expressed in such a statutory
scheme, to allow such injunctions in the occasional case in which the bringing or
maintenance of a state court lawsuit itself constitutes a violation of federal
134. 433 U.S. at 660-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 52-92.
136. See Redish, supra note 119, at 734-36.
137. The stated purpose of the Act was to restore "the basic law as generally understood and
interpreted prior to ... Toucey [v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118(1941)]." 28 U.S.C. § 2283
note (1982). Although the reviser's note certainly has specific reference to reinstating the "relitigation" exception that Toucey had wiped out, see Redish, supra note 119, at 729, there is nothing in the
note to suggest that the stated purpose was not also true at a more general level. But see Redish,
supra note 119, at 729-30 & no. 63-64. Prior to Toucey, many exceptions were less than fully express. See Currie, supranote 16, at 322. Although the Mitchum/Lektro-Vend approach to the Act's
expressly authorized exception may not be the most obvious construction of the statute's language, it
harmonizes better with the comity and federalism policies traditionally underlying the anti-injunction statute insofar as it allows interference only when continued state court litigation could leave the
supremacy of the federal law unvindicated. See also infra text accompanying notes 140-41 (noting
that federalism and comity have guided courts in reading § 2283).
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law.' 38 Despite the Court's own suggestions to the contrary, the strength or

weakness of such federalism and comity concerns often have been 3the
touch9
stone for construing the intended scope of the Anti-Injunction Act.'
B. Noninterference: Younger or Section 2283?
If this approach accurately reflects the Court's concerns in modern AntiInjunction Act litigation, Younger in many ways adds very little. Currently,
section 1983 is an express exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. However, the
Younger doctrine, curiously borrowing from the policy of a statute that

Mitchum concluded did not reach section 1983 at all, bars injunction actions
under section 1983 against ongoing state enforcement proceedings. It was unnecessary, however, to read the Anti-Injunction Act as requiring that a particular federal statute, such as section 1983, be an "expressly authorized" exception

every time a suit is brought under it for an injunction to be expressly authorized
for some violations of the statute. The express exception language only had to

cover the handful of cases brought under section 1983 and similar statutes in
which Congress made ongoing state court proceedings the fair target of injunc-

tive relief, such as those brought in bad faith. Thus, the Anti-Injunction Act
ordinarily might have barred injunctions against ongoing state court proceedings
even when, for example, the federal suit was brought under section 1983. Given
the overlap between the Younger exceptions and the expressly authorized excep-

tions of section 2283 as outlined in Mitchum and Lektro- Vend, federalism140principles could have been largely vindicated by use of section 2283 alone.

Of

138. For the argument that a bad faith prosecution is itself a violation of § 1983, see supra text
accompanying notes 59-61.
139. See Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 225-26 (1957) (federal court injunction of state court proceeding sought by United States not barred, despite absence of express or
other exception in Anti-Injunction Act); see also NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 146 (197 1)
(Leiter rule applies to injunction sought by federal agency); cf Capital Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S.
501, 505 (1954) (upholding as "in aid of its jurisdiction" district court injunction of state court
lawsuit at behest of National Labor Relations Board to preserve Board's and, ultimately, federal trial
court's exclusive jurisdiction over picketing dispute). But cf Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286-87 (1970) (Anti-Injunction Act will not allow injunction unless within one of three specifically defined exceptions). Suits brought by the United States
are exempt from the Tax Injunction Act's ban as well. See Department of Employment v. United
States, 385 U.S. 355, 358 (1966).
140. A similar exceptional circumstances approach to § 2283, but one which eschewed a liberal
reading of the Act's "expressly authorized" language, was advanced prior to Mitchun in Baines v.
City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964), aff'd on reh'g, 357 F.2d 756 (en banc), af'd per
curiain, 384 U.S. 890 (1966). In Baines the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
noted:
Since [section 2283] was fathered by the principles of federalism and comity ....
the
statute should be read in light of those principles and, though absolute in its terms, is
inapplicable in extraordinary cases in which an injunction against state court proceedings
is the only means of avoiding grave and irreparable injury.
Id. at 593; cf Currie, supra note 16, at 329 (approving the Bahies test for antisuit injunctions,
although rejecting it as a valid reading of § 2283). The Court has resisted such an exceptional circumstances approach to § 2283, even though Mitchuin and Lektro-Vend achieve a similar result by
the alternate route of tinkering with the meaning of "expressly authorized" exceptions. See Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 286-87 (rejecting contention that § 2283 merely sets out a principle of
comity that would allow injunctions in situations not within language of statutory exceptions).
Under the approach suggested here, § 2283, like Younger, would be inapplicable to civil or criminal
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course, Younger is stronger medicine than section 2283 in one regard: it can
prohibit parallel litigation in federal court altogether, even if no injunction
14 1
against the state proceeding is sought.
Although the Court has drawn the connection between Younger and section
2283,142 it has not allowed the statute to control the issue of injunctions against
state courts in the section 1983 context. In part, the Court made that impossible
when, a year before Younger, it observed that section 2283 was not simply a
"principle of comity.' 1 4 3 Mitchum, however, went a long way toward viewing
section 2283 as just such a provision by its loose reading of what constitutes an
expressly authorized exception.
If the Court had pegged the no-injunction rule in section 1983 cases to
section 2283 instead of Younger, it might have produced a few advantages.
First, the abstention rule blocking the exercise of federal relief would have remained a congressional rather than a judicial prohibition. Second, it would have
placed the problematic judge-made "exceptions" to the judge-made Younger
doctrine into a category of "expressly authorized" congressional exceptions to a
congressional enactment. Finally, the much discussed problem of Younger's applicability to all state civil proceedings, whether or not in the nature of enforcement actions, 144 would have been largely mooted. The Anti-Injunction Act
itself would have barred federal stays of ongoing state civil proceedings absent
exceptional circumstances. It would not, however, have required the federal
court to abstain altogether, as Younger does. 145 The presence of what is now a
Younger exception-bad faith, harassment, patent unconstitutionality, or other
structural inadequacy of the state courts to redress the loss of federal interestscould have authorized injunctions under section 2283 against state civil proceedings as express exceptions to the Act. As things now stand, many such suits
oddly escape both the bar of the Anti-Injunction Act and the Younger doctrine.
In any event, the exceptions to Younger and the exceptional circumstances
gloss on the scope of the Anti-Injunction Act work in very much the same way.
They also seek similar objectives. Under either, interference with ongoing state
court proceedings should be avoided unless their continuation would work an
proceedings that have not yet been instituted. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2
(1965).
141. See supra note 10.
142. See supra text accompanying note 115.
143. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 286.
144. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 453-56 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592 (1975). Literature abounds on the question whether Younger
should generally bar federal court injunctions of civil proceedings in state court. See, e.g., M. REDISH, supranote 40, at 315-21; Bartels, Avoiding a Comity of Errors: A Modelfor AdjudicatingFederal
Civil Rights Suits That "Interfere" With State Civil Proceedings, 29 STAN. L. REV. 27 (1976); Theis,
Younger v. Harris: Federalism in Context, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 103, 172-84 (1981); Note, The New
FederalComity: Pursuitof Younger in a Civil Context, 61 IOWA L. REV. 784 (1976); Note, Younger
Grows Older: Equitable Abstention in Civil Proceedings, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870 (1975).
145. If Younger's judge-made equitable restraint doctrines were applied with full force when
ordinary civil proceedings were pending in state court, federal courts might be barred not only from
granting injunctive (or declaratory) relief, but arguably from proceeding at all. See Juidice v. Vail,
430 U.S. 327, 339 n.16 (1977) (leaving open question whether Younger bars parallel damages action
under § 1983 in federal court).
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irretrievable denial of a federally protected interest. It might even be possible to
reach the Younger result in section 1983 cases without looking beyond section

2283. Although the results in most cases seeking to enjoin state enforcement
proceedings would be the same, such a statutory approach might better cabin
the Court's zeal to create additional and more expansive judge-made rules of
46
noninterference. 1

IV.

CIVIL RIGHTS REMOVAL AND IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION

The concern for irreparable harm and adequate state remedies also spills

over into removal. Most statutes allowing removal from state to federal court
merely shift the trial forum. Although they provide a federally enforceable right
not to be tried in state court, they do not let a litigant avoid suit altogether.14 7
Sometimes, however, removal can be in the nature of a right not to undergo

continued judicial proceedings in any forum. The Court's modern treatment of
the civil rights removal statute is a good example. 4 8 The current version, de-

rived from an 1866 ancestor,' 49 allows for removal of civil or criminal actions

from state to federal court when a party "is denied or cannot enforce" in the

state courts a right granted by federal law relating to race discrimination.' 50
The statute is significant because criminal cases ordinarily cannot be removed at

all, and because a federal defense, by itself, is not enough to secure removal in
51
civil cases.1
Over twenty years ago in Georgia v. Rachel' 5 2 the Court construed the
language of this civil rights statute to mean that removal of state court proceed-

ings was available when such proceedings were directed at activity that federal
statutes protected against suit altogether.

Act t 54

53

Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights

provided for nondiscrimination in public accommodations and outlawed

146. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 16, at 114-15 (criticizing judge-made abstention rules).
147. At one time, however, removal had to be requested from the state court. See REV. STAT.
§ 641 (1874) (precursor of civil rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1982)). If the state court
denied removal when it should have granted it, review of that question lay in the Supreme Court
following trial in the state court. Id.; see also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 311 (1879)
(wrongful refusal to allow civil rights removal heard on direct review from state supreme court).
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1982). The statute provides, inter alia, for removal of state civil actions and criminal prosecutions "[a]gainst any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts
of such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United
States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof."
149. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1982)),
The Act's history is discussed at length in Amsterdam, supra note 16, at 842-82.
150. See supra note 148.
151. .5eesupranote 8.
152. 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
153. Id. at 794; see also New York v. Davis, 411 F.2d 750, 753-54 (2d Cir.) (removal statute
reaches "prosecutions in which the conduct necessary to constitute the offense is specifically protected by a federal equal rights statute" and prosecution is for that conduct), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
856 (1969). Although this is the prevailing interpretation of Rachel, an alternative reading would
allow removal even when the state criminal charges were not brought, on their face, for conduct
protected by federal law, if they were nevertheless brought because of protected activity. See, eg.,
Achtenberg v. Mississippi, 393 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1968); see also Redish, Revitalizing Civil Rights
Removal Jurisdiction, 64 MINN. L. REV. 523, 540-41 (1980) (proposing broader reading of statute
than that articulated in Rachel).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2(c) (1982).

1987]

FEDERAL COURT INTER VENTION

"punishment" against anyone for exercising or attempting to exercise any right
under the statute.1 55 In Rachel, the State had prosecuted black defendants in
state court under a criminal trespass law for seeking service at restaurants and
refusing to leave.' 5 6 State law made it a misdemeanor to refuse to leave the
premises of another after being asked to do so; defendants charged that the demand to leave was racially motivated. 157 In allowing removal the Court concluded that "[t]he burden of having to defend the prosecutions is itself the denial
of a right explicitly conferred by the Civil Rights Act of 1964."158 The Act not
only created a right to engage in particular conduct and to be free from the
eventual imposition of liability or conviction for such conduct, but also created a
59
separate right that such conduct be "immunized from prosecution"', in the
state courts.
The result of allowing removal in cases such as Rachel is the equivalent of
an injunction against the ongoing prosecution. Removal of this variety lets the
federal court decide whether or not the state prosecution should be barred at the
outset, before trial. It is not a decision that the prosecution should be maintained in the federal as opposed to the state forum. 160 To this extent, the
Court's decision that a federal court may abort proceedings in the state courts
reflects a concern for the adequacy of state court remedies and the need for
immediate federal interference to protect against the possible irreparable loss of
federal rights-here, the right not to endure "punishment" in the form of a trial.
In terms of the civil rights removal statute, having to raise the federal defense
through the state court system "denie[s] . . . in the [state] courts" the rights
protected by Title 11.161 The harm of undergoing a proceeding from which a
litigant is statutorily immunized is thus analogous to the double jeopardy and
bad faith paradigm under Younger, and to the "expressly authorized" exceptions
to the Anti-Injunction Act.
After Younger and Mitchum, however, a litigant in a case such as Rachel
155. Section 203(c) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2(c) (1982), provides that "[n]o person shall
... punish or attempt to punish any person for exercising or attempting to exercise any right or
privilege secured by [the Act]."
156. Rachel, 384 U.S. at 782-83.
157. Id. at 783 n.1.
158. Id. at 805.
159. Id. ("It is no answer in these circumstances that the defendants might eventually prevail in
the state court."); see also Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 311-12 (1964) (interpreting
§ 203(c) of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2(c)(1982), to prohibit not only
conviction, but also prosecution); Note, FederalJurisdiction: The Civil Rights Removal Statute Revisited, 1967 DUKE L.J. 136, 160 n.122 (noting that rights under Title II were to receive removal
protection).
160. See City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 846-47 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Note, Civil Rights Removal After Rachel and Peacock: A Limited FederalRemedy, 121 U. PA. L.
REV. 351, 376 (1972). Although removal results in termination of the proceedings in cases following
the Rachel paradigm, removals traditionally permitted under the statute simply operated as a forumtransfer rule. See, eg., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (existence of state statute
barring blacks from petit juries "denied" state court defendant's ability to enforce his rights within
meaning of removal statute; state prosecution was removable and ought to have been tried in federal
court).
161. See 28 U.S.C. § 1443(l) (1982). As in the Younger bad faith and double jeopardy context,
however, the state court defendant could, but need not, have raised federal immunity from prosecution as a defense to the ongoing state proceeding.
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would not have to seek civil rights removal, because an injunction against the
state court criminal proceedings might do the job equally well. Continued maintenance of the proceedings would result in a loss of federal statutory rights-

such as the right to avoid punishment in the form of a trial-that could not be
fully remedied by subsequent corrective process. Therefore, Younger's excep-

tional circumstances doctrine would seem to allow for immediate intervention in
a suit under section 1983 against the prosecuting official for violating federal law

by bringing a state court lawsuit.162 Rachel also might be explained in Younger
terms as a case involving a prosecution undertaken in bad faith, given the retali-

atory nature of the proceedings, and the specific and obvious conflict between
the state statute and the federal guarantee. Alternatively, under the current approach to the Anti-Injunction Act, a federal court could find that the state pros-

ecution in Rachel violated Title II. It could then issue an injunction against the
prosecution if Title II also authorized
injunctive relief against "punishment" in
63
the form of state proceedings.'

In Rachel and many other cases, therefore, injunctive relief might do the

trick and do so in a more "elegant" manner. 164 In civil cases removal is effected

simply by the filing of papers in the federal and state courts; on removal, federal

law commands that state proceedings come to a halt. 165 Federal judicial input
comes only afterward, usually on a motion to remand brought by the nonremoving party. An injunction against state court proceedings, by contrast, can only
be issued after federal judicial consideration. Even in criminal cases the state
court may be prevented from entering judgment until removal is denied,
although proceedings are not arrested by the mere act of filing removal
papers.

16 6

Although the civil rights removal remedy overlaps with other immediate
coercive relief, it is, as construed, somewhat less effective. In City of Greeniwood
v. Peacock, 167 decided the same day as Rachel, the Court held that removal was
unavailable when prosecutions were brought under facially constitutional statutes that criminalized breaches of the peace, even though the prosecutions were
alleged to be in retaliation for defendants' exercise of constitutionally and statu162. See Peacock, 384 U.S. at 829; see also Redish, supra note 153, at 554 n.153 (allegations of
Peacock seemed appropriate for injunction under Younger exceptions). A violation of a federal statute by a state actor can be a violation of § 1983, see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. I (1980), at least
when the federal statute does not set up its own comprehensive enforcement scheme. See Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
163. Title II is privately enforceable, and injunctive relief against violations of the statute is
expressly granted. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (1982); ef. Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d 226, 230-32 (5th
Cir. 1965) (injunction under Title II against state court proceedings held expressly authorized exception to antisuit injunction statute).
164. Bator, supra note 12, at 616-17; see also Redish, supra note 153, at 555 n.155 (arguing that
injunctions are less disruptive than removal).
165. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1982) (commanding that after removal "the State court shall
proceed no further.") When federal statutes allow removal, such statutes also constitute exceptions
to the Anti-Injunction Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982); id. § 2283 historical and revision notes; id.
§ 1447(a) (1982).
166. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(3) (1982).
167. 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
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torily protected activity.1 68 Despite the similarity to the Rachel facts, the Peacock Court held that the denial in state courts of rights to which the civil rights
removal statute refers must be the result of a facially unconstitutional state stat169
It
ute or an equally clear inconsistency between federal law and state action.
could not result from official illegality in the teeth of an otherwise lawful state
statute.
This narrow approach stemmed from two century-old cases in which the
removal applicants alleged racial discrimination in the petit juries trying them.
In one case, which held removal proper, the discrimination against seating
blacks on the jury had been mandated by statute. 170 In the other, in which
removal was not proper, the discrimination was in violation of state law mandating nondiscriminatory jury selection. 1 7 1 The implicit presumption in those cases
was that when the removal applicant alleged a denial of federal rights in state
court because of the operation of a state statute, only then would the state court
fail to redress the injury. In such cases, the state court would instead follow its
own statutes. This presumption runs counter to current tenets of federalism
suggesting that the states ordinarily can be expected to enforce federal laws,
72
state statutes to the contrary notwithstanding.'
The modem Court distilled from those two older cases the principle that
the denial of federal rights in the state courts would, respectively, be easier or
harder to "predict" depending on whether the civil rights claimant challenged
the operation of a statute or charged official illegality-that is, activity contrary
to state law.173 Before trial, a federal trial court could easily predict a denial of
federal rights by looking at the face of the state statute and comparing it with the
federal law. If the denial of rights was founded on official illegality, however, the
court would have to engage in a case-by- case factual inquiry into the basis of the
prosecution. 174 In the absence of facial inconsistencies, the federal court must
have a basis equally as clear as the facial clash between a state and federal statute on which to premise removal. Rachel provided such a basis in Title II's
"clear" immunization from prosecution of the activity it protected. 175 State
168. Id. at 827-28.
169. Id. at 828.
170. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
171. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
172. See Redish, supra note 153, at 530. The reason for the dichotomy probably lies in the
Court's since-discarded analysis of "state action" as reaching only state practices either codified by
statute or approved by the state's highest court. But see id. (considering this a "possible, but unlikely
...rationale for the distinction"). A state did not act for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment,
and the judicial system did not "deny" rights, unless it did so pursuant to the authoritative command of the legislature; official illegality was not state action until the state courts had refused to
give an individual the ability to enforce in the judicial tribunals of the state the rights contemplated
by the removal act. See Rives, 100 U.S. at 320-22; id. at 333-34 (Field, J., concurring); see also
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 212 n.16 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing Barney v. City of
New York, 193 U.S. 430) (1904); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 38, at 941-47; cf Monell v. New
York City Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (city "causes" deprivation under § 1983 only when its
officers act pursuant to custom or policy, not when they act in an unauthorized manner).
173. See Rachel, 384 U.S. at 800-04.
174. A factual hearing might still be necessary to resolve the question whether the refusal to
serve was itself racially motivated. See Redish, supra note 153, at 534-35 & n.59.
175. Rachel, 384 U.S. at 805-06.
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statutes made it a crime to refuse to leave private property when asked. If the
request to leave was racially motivated, state law made illegal an activity that
was protected under federal law. 176 By contrast, the more generally worded
federal statutes and constitutional provisions relied on in Peacock lacked any

explicit reference to immunity from punishment or retaliation for the exercise of

the activities they otherwise protected. 177 In addition, the state breach of the
peace statute in Peacock did not include within its scope any activities protected
by federal law.
The civil rights removal statute reflects a number of the concerns for the

adequacy of the state forum to handle certain federal claims, but adds little or
nothing to other forms of immediate intervention given the Supreme Court's

restrictive gloss on it. The statute gives even less than Younger, insofar as it is
limited to racial discrimination and precludes the federal courts from making

factually based inquiries into, and issuing injunctive relief against, prosecutorial
reprisals for the exercise of rights under federal statutes or the Constitution.

78

As the Peacock dissent noted, and as the bad faith exception of Younger later
seemed to account for, a defendant "is denied" federal rights in state court when
lawful state statutes are "used as the instrument to suppress his promotion of
179
civil rights."
Perhaps the Court was right to limit removal with a requirement of showing jurisdiction on the face of the pleadings, because removal is potentially more
disruptive of state proceedings than injunctive relief. Remand questions can
thereby be decided quickly, with minimal factual inquiry. The greater need for a
federal factfinder at the trial level when questions of bad faith or harassment are
involved, however, suggests that Younger actually may have struck a more sensible and, for civil rights litigants, a more favorable balance than that struck in the
removal cases. 180
176. The clarity of the conflict, however, would seem to make it an easier job for the state courts
if the "immunity" from prosecution were raised as a defense to the state court suit. Cf.supra text
accompanying notes 85-92 (discussing patent unconstitutionality exception to Younger).
177. Peacock, 384 U.S. at 825-27. The federal plaintiffs alleged that the prosecutions in Peacock
were brought against them in retaliation for assisting others to exercise voting rights. The relevant
federal statute only protected voters, not their helpers, from retaliation. See also Whatley v. City of
Vidalia, 399 F.2d 521, 524-26 (5th Cir. 1968) (allowing removal under amended version of voting
statute that protected helpers as well as voters). In Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213 (1975), the
Court concluded that Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1982), which protected against "intimidation or interference with" the exercise of certain civil rights "by force or
threat of force," did not protect against retaliatory arrests or court proceedings.
178. Even the Peacock majority noted that injunctive relief under the then-recently decided case
of Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), could provide a broader avenue of federal court
access for such claims of prosecutorial retaliation. See Peacock, 384 U.S. at 829; see also Johnson,
421 U.S. at 228 & n.17 (observing that denial of civil rights removal did not foreclose injunction
against state proceeding).
179. Peacock, 384 U.S. at 842 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
180. Cf.Amsterdam, supranote 16, at 857 (observing that a federal trial court "is least needed"
when a state statute bars enforcement of a federal right); Currie, supra note 16, at 330-31; Redish,
supra note 153, at 547-57 (arguing for construction of removal statute that would allow case-by-case
inquiry into adequacy). As a practical matter, the Court's construction robs the removal statute of
any independent utility. This alone might be a reason to interpret it more broadly so as to give it
meaning apart from other remedies. But the perceived superfluity of § 1443 may be just as much a
consequence of the expansive reading that the Court has given to § 1983.
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V.

PRETRIAL HABEAS CORPUS AND THE "SPECIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES" DOCTRINE

There is a similar and parallel rule barring pretrial intervention into pending criminal proceedings by way of federal habeas corpus. Since 1867, federal
courts have been given the power of habeas corpus to discharge persons not yet
convicted who are in state custody "in violation of the Constitution."' 18 1 Because of an exhaustion rule that is almost as old as the statute, however, federal
habeas is generally unavailable before judgment. 182 Intervention by habeas
corpus is not immediately available after judgment either, because federal statutes forbid granting the writ to those convicted in state courts until all state
court appeals have first been tried.' 8 3 Unlike the posttrial exhaustion requirement, the requirement of pretrial exhaustion remains a judge-made device. Nevertheless, the prohibition on pretrial habeas corpus has not been absolute, and
there exists a set of exceptions to the exhaustion rule that is analogous to the set
of exceptions the Court has carved out under Younger, the Anti-Injunction Act,
and to a lesser extent, the civil rights removal statute.
A.

Ex parte Royall and the Exhaustion Rule

The exhaustion rule that bars federal habeas interference before trial
originated in Ex parte Royall, 184 in which a federal petitioner, relying on the
1867 statute, claimed that the statutes under which he was being prosecuted in
state court were unconstitutional. 185 His petitions were dismissed in the federal
trial court for want of jurisdiction, but on this point the Supreme Court unanimously reversed. 186 It disagreed with the lower federal court's conclusion that
it lacked jurisdiction over the claim simply because the unconstitutionality of the
187
state law could be raised as a defense at trial in state court.
Prior to Royall, the Court had decided in postconviction habeas cases that
the writ could issue when the statute on which the lower court judgment had
been premised was unconstitutional. 188 The Court concluded in those cases that
the unconstitutionality of the underlying statute resulted in a "jurisdictional"
failure on the part of the lower courts. 189 The federal courts had the power on
habeas corpus to determine the constitutionality of the underlying statutes
181. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3),
2254(a) (1982)).
182. See Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886).
183. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982). Even after judgment, however, exhaustion is not required
if "state corrective process" is absent or "ineffective" to protect the prisoner's rights. Id.; see also
supra note 105 (discussing exceptions to § 2254(b)).
184. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
185. Id. at 245.
186. Id. at 250.
187. Id. at 250-51.
188. See, e.g., Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 374-77 (1879); cf.Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
342-43 (1879) (writ could issue when prisoner held by an order beyond jurisdiction of lower federal
court to enter); Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176-78 (1873) (writ could issue when petitioner's sentence was beyond power of lower federal court to enter).
189. The history of this "jurisdictional" approach is recounted in Bator, Finality in Criminal
Law and Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners,76 HARv. L. REv. 441, 479-83 (1963).
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before trial, not just after, because "if the local statute under which [the state
court defendant] was indicted be repugnant to the Constitution, the prosecution
against him has nothing upon which to rest, and the entire proceeding against
him is a nullity."1 90 To modem ears this jurisdictional failure doctrine is curious. But because of it, the Court was able to preserve the traditional and narrow
use of habeas corpus to challenge the want of power in the trial court, instead of
using it to correct substantive errors of law, which is its current-but probably
not its historic-function. 19 1
Nevertheless, the Court in Royall went on to consider whether the refusal
of the trial court to issue the writ could be sustained on any ground other than
the want of judicial power. It was in this context that the Court issued its famous ruling on exhaustion of state court remedies. It concluded that although
federal courts had the statutory jurisdiction to grant the writ, the statute did not
"imperatively require" 192 them to grant it in advance of trial in the state court.
In language that foreshadowed the exceptions to Younger's noninterference rule,
the Royall Court held that federal courts had discretion not to discharge the
petitioner in advance of trial, so long as there were no "special circumstances
requiring immediate action."' 193 As actually enforced by the Supreme Court,
however, this doctrine was apparently not discretionary at all. Rather, it
amounted to an almost per se rule of exhaustion in ordinary cases challenging
the constitutionality of detention, absent "special circumstances." 1 94 Even today, exhaustion is viewed as a requirement.195
The Court gave some hints in Royall as to when special circumstances
might warrant immediate federal intervention into pending state proceedings. It
noted that federal courts had "frequently interposed"' 9 6 whenever the state
court defendant awaiting trial was in custody for acts done in pursuance of federal law or a federal court order, or whenever the defendant was a foreign subject acting under color of foreign law and the case implicated the law of nations.
"[S]uch and like cases of urgency, involv[ed] the authority and operations of the
General Government, or the obligations of this country to, or its relations with,
foreign nations .... ,,197 Writs of habeas corpus to compel a witness in state
190. Royall, 117 U.S. at 248.
191. See Bator, supranote 189, at 463-65. For a different answer to the question whether habeas
was originally intended to do more than reach "jurisdictional" defects, see Peller, In Defense of
FederalHabeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 635-39 (1982).
192. Royall, 117 U.S. at 251.
193. Id. at 253.
194. See Bator, supra note 189, at 478. But cf Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal
HabeasCorpus: An Argument for a Return to First Principles,44 OHIO ST. L.J. 393, 420-40 (1983)
(arguing that rigidification of the once discretionary exhaustion doctrine is a comparatively recent
development). See generally W. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 20003 (1980) (tracing early application of "special circumstances" rule).
195. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 516 n.9 (1982); Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482, 487
(1975) (per curiam).
196. Royall, 117 U.S. at 251.
197. Id. Shortly after Royall, the Court decided a handful of cases in which it upheld pretrial
granting of the writ. See, e.g., In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75-76 (1890) (writ granted to Justice Field's
bodyguard held by state authorities and awaiting trial for murder of Field's would-be assassin);
Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1886) (writ should have issued for Belgian sailors, held by state
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custody to testify in federal court were justified on a similar rationale of preserving federal operations and of vindicating the authority of the federal government. 198 The 1867 statute had conferred, as it had for persons detained in
violation of the Constitution, habeas jurisdiction over each one of these specific
categories of persons in custody as well: Federal officers and others acting under
color of federal law, foreign defendants, and federal court witnesses. 199 By treating each of these groups as candidates for the special circumstances rule, however, the Court effectively singled out for its judicial exhaustion requirement0
'20
only those who attacked their custody as "in violation of the Constitution.
The concerns voiced by the Court that prompted its exhaustion rule also
foreshadowed the concerns underlying Younger's noninterference rule.
Although Congress, by its very enactment of the habeas statute, seemed prepared to tolerate some intrusion into the state criminal process, the Court sought
to minimize that interference on its own. To do so, it relied on the presumption
that state judges would not disregard the settled principles of federal constitutional law. 20 1 Nevertheless, most of the special circumstances the Court identiauthorities and awaiting trial for murder committed on board Belgian steamship, who claimed detention was in violation of law of nations and treaty requiring that they be tried exclusively in Belgian courts). In neither Neagle nor Wildenhus's Case did the Court cite Royall. See W. DUKER,
supra note 194, at 200-03; Amsterdam, supra note 16, at 882-96.
198. Royall, 117 U.S. at 251-52.
199. The Act provided:
The writ of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to a prisoner in jail, unless where he
is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States, or is committed for
trial before some court thereof; or is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a
law or treaty of the United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a court or judge
thereof; or is in custody in violation of the Constitution, or of a law or treaty of the United
States; or being a subject or citizen of a foreign state, and domiciled therein, is in custody
for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or
exemption claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction of any foreign state, or
under color thereof, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations; or
unless it is necessary to bring the prisoner into court to testify.
REV. STAT. § 753 (1874).
200. See supra note 199. The Court hinted that special circumstances demanding immediate
action might surround a habeas request even under this latter provision when it observed that Royall
himself had not made any claim "that he [was] unable to give security for his appearance in the state
court, or that reasonable bail [had been] denied him, or that his trial will be unnecessarily delayed."
Royall, 117 U.S. at 250.
201. According to the Court,
[w]e cannot suppose that Congress intended to compel [federal trial] courts, by such
means, to draw to themselves, in the first instance, the control of all criminal prosecutions
commenced in State courts exercising authority within the same territorial limits, where
the accused claims that he is held in custody in violation of the Constitution of the United
States. The injunction to hear the case summarily, and thereupon "to dispose of the case as
law and justice require" does not deprive the court of discretion as to the time and mode in
which it will exert the powers conferred upon it. That discretion should be exercised in the
light of the relations existing, under our system of government, between the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the States, and in recognition of the fact that the public good
requires that those relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts
equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution.
117 U.S. at 251.
The observation that the state courts would not ignore the Constitution's impact on nonconforming state laws is in contrast to the Court's conclusion, reached only a few years earlier in the
civil rights removal cases, that the state courts were least to be trusted when the question was the
constitutionality of a state statute. See supra note 172.
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fled as warranting immediate federal intervention also involved federal questions
that could have been raised as defenses to the state court proceedings and ones
that the state courts could have initially resolved by themselves. Defenses involving foreign law or treaties, or official immunity for acts under color of federal authority, would not seem to be any tougher for the state courts to handle
than complex questions under the Constitution.
Perhaps these exceptions are best explained by the reversal of federalism
needs that prompted the exhaustion rule in the first place. Many of the defendants in cases involving the law of nations were foreign nationals, a group toward
whom the federal government might be especially protective because of fear of
local hostility or the potential impact that a conviction might have on relations
with foreign powers. 20 2 Similarly, fear of local hostility rather than the general
ability of state courts to construe substantive law accurately would be a reason
for giving federal officers a federal trial forum. 203 In addition, when persons
acting under color of federal law, such as federal officers, are involuntary litigants in state court because of their arguably federal activity, sovereignty and
law enforcement concerns are present on both the federal and state sides of the
balance. The federal government has an interest in noninterference with its own
efforts at law enforcement and administration that is analogous to the state interest usually served by the exhaustion of state remedies rule. This "reverse"
federalism interest 2° 4 places such cases in a separate category from those involving private defendants with constitutional objections to the state proceedings.
However, even this protective jurisdiction rationale for foreigners and federal officers does not wholly explain why federal court intervention on their behalf needs to be pretrial instead of posttrial. Nor does it fully explain why these
parties could not be required to raise their federal defenses in state court, unless
the potential for damage to federal interests somehow might arise in the mere
undergoing of proceedings in the state courts. The presence of a hospitable
factfinder for the enforcement of federal interests is, of course, a standard justification for giving parties with federal claims access to the federal trial courts. 20 5
But that argument would not be unique to these defendants. The sympathetic202. Cf U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending federal judicial power to suits "between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects"); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1982) (conferring district court jurisdiction over suits between "citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a
foreign state"). Although foreigners who are sued in state courts can remove civil suits to federal
court, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(2), 1441(a) (1982), the general removal statute does not cover criminal proceedings.
203. See Mishkin, The Federal "Question"in the District Court, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157, 184-96
(1953).
204. Federalism is, in theory, a two-way street. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)
("['Our Federalism'] does not mean blind deference to 'States' Rights' any more than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts.").
Thus, it may be somewhat imprecise to refer to "reverse" federalism interests to describe those
sovereignty interests that tilt in favor of the federal as opposed to state government. The term "federalism," however, seems to have become something of a code word for "States' Rights" after all.
See Soifer & MacGill, supra note 26, at 1186.
205. See, e.g., Hornstein, Federalism.JudicialPower and the "Arising Under" Jurisdictionofthe
FederalCourts: A HierarchicalAnalysis, 56 IND. L.J. 563, 564-65 (1981); cf. Mishkin, supra note
203, at 172-76 (arguing that hospitable factfinder is rationale for federal officer removal).
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federal-factfinder argument could just as easily be raised by ordinary defendants
to state enforcement actions who raise due process or equal protection challenges to their detention. Moreover, the possible collateral fallout from a firstin-time state court judgment is not a special circumstance for federal intervention in other areas. 20 6 Besides, preclusion rules are already relaxed in the habeas
20 7
corpus context.
However, there may be a marginally greater possibility for interference with
supremacy concerns from temporary disruption of federal programs or foreign
relations incident to undergoing state trial and ordinary appellate process, than
when an ordinary private litigant goes through the same good faith process. In
the context of federal officers, the unavailability of a federal trial forum poses the
obvious and delicate problem of state courts potentially controlling agents of a
paramount sovereign. 208 Although erroneous state court orders pose dangers of
state-federal confrontation, similar erroneous decisions by a federal court would
not. For those very reasons certain federal officers have long enjoyed the analogous vehicle of removal to extricate themselves from state courts for acts taken
under color of office. 20 9 Also, erroneously forcing a federal officer to stand trial
poses a risk of interference with ongoing law enforcement efforts-an interest
that typically is not associated with private parties raising ordinary federal defenses. Run-of-the-mill objections to state action on constitutional grounds
raised by private litigants in ordinary criminal cases pose only a more generalized potential for injury to federally protected interests, a potential that can
more readily be remedied by posttrial process. From a judicial administration
perspective, it may have been the very everydayness or frequency of constitutional objections by private parties that weighed against federal intervention, just
2 10
as it did in the injunction context under Younger.
B.

Avoiding Exhaustion After Royall

So engrained is the exhaustion rule that the modern Court has only rarely
permitted intervention into ongoing state proceedings through pretrial habeas.
The diminished utility of pretrial habeas derives in part from the fact the federal
officers who made such frequent use of it in the nineteenth century now all have
recourse to their own special removal statute. 2 1' Further, because extraordi206. See, eg., Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 235 (1922).
207. See infra notes 270 & 274.
208. Cf Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 411-12 (1872) (holding that state court lacks
power on habeas corpus to inquire into validity of federal soldier's enlistment).
209. See infra note 211. Interference with federal law enforcement was a starkly real possibility
in the nineteenth century even in civil cases, because proceedings could be commenced by physical
arrest of the defendant officer. See Gibbons, Federal Law and the State Courts 1790-1860, 36
RUTGERS L. REV. 399, 410, 434 (1984).
210. See Shapiro, supra note 16, at 549-50, 587-88.
211. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)-(4) (1982). In the nineteenth century, federal habeas promised
that most federal defenses of federal officers in state-initiated criminal cases would be heard originally by a federal court. Across-the-board federal officer removal in civil and criminal cases did not
exist until 1948. See HART & WECHS.ER, supra note 38, at 422-23, 1335-38. Before then, federal
officers in civil suits had to rely on the handful of specific removal statutes that covered their position. See Collins, supra note 8, at 767 & nn. 225-28 (discussing federal question removal in civil
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nary circumstances warranting pretrial habeas ordinarily will constitute an exception to Younger's noninterference rule as well, injunctive relief often is
available to criminal defendants without having to meet the extra requirement of
custody. 212 For example, double jeopardy claims, which can present appropriate occasions for the exercise of equitable relief against an ongoing state proceeding under the Younger exceptional circumstances formula, also have prompted
courts to abort trial through the vehicle of pretrial habeas. 2 13 In addition, injunctive relief may sometimes be preferable to habeas because it is a procedurally
2 14
more convenient vehicle for seeking class-wide or systemic relief.
In its only recent pretrial habeas decision, the Court in Braden n: 30th Judicial Circuit Court21 5 approved pretrial relief to compel a speedy trial in a state
court on an outstanding charge for which the federal petitioner, who was in state
custody for other crimes, was not then being tried. The majority distinguished
Royall by finding that the petitioner in Braden had not sought to adjudicate a
defense to a prosecution, but had simply demanded enforcement of the constitutional right to be brought speedily to trial. 21 6 As to that present denial, there
was no state forum in which he could get relief. The dissent urged that the
petitioner was seeking, Younger-style, to enjoin state officials "to litigate a question that otherwise could only be raised as an absolute defense in a state criminal
proceeding" against him. 2 17 The dissent was correct insofar as the effect of a
successful pretrial habeas ruling was the equivalent of an injunction directed to
state officials either to commence prosecution against someone in unquestionably lawful custody or to drop it altogether. But it was wrong to the extent it
understood that such issues always could be raised effectively by defense to a
state proceeding. In many cases habeas applicants could languish indefinitely
without ever being brought to trial, unless there was some way to challenge their
continued confinement by demanding a speedy trial. Braden is, therefore, the
habeas corpus analog to the Younger exception, recognized in Gerstein v.
Pugh,2 18 that allowed an injunction to force the state to compel probable cause
cases). The modem statute appears to allow for removal whenever the defendant officer engaged in
acts "under color of office," even if no federal defense or immunity is raised. The courts of appeals,
however, are divided on the question. Compare California v. Mesa, 813 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1987)
(federal officer status alone will not secure removal; some federal defense must be raised) with Pennsylvania v. Newcomer, 618 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1980) (federal officers may remove any action brought
against them in state court for acts within scope of employment).
212. See, e.g., Dolack v. Allenbrand, 548 F.2d 891, 893 (10th Cir. 1977); Kolski v. Watkins, 544
F.2d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 1977); Moore v. De Young, 515 F.2d 437, 447-48 (3d Cir. 1975); ef W.C.M.
Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 491 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying habeas doctrine of futility to
Younger).
213. See, eg., Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 298, 302-03 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982); Gully v. Kunzman,
592 F.2d 283, 287 & n.8 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 924 (1979); Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F.2d
117, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1979); United States ex rel. Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034,
1039 n.18 (3d Cir. 1975); Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218, 221-24 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
999 (1975).
214. See Ziegler, supra note 100, at 300-05.
215. 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
216. See id. at 489-90. The federal petitioner was serving a sentence in an Alabama prison, and
he sought habeas to compel trial in Kentucky on unrelated charges. Id. at 487.
217. Id. at 503 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
218. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
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hearings for pretrial detainees.
Braden might have been decided differently had the federal petitioner then
been in an ongoing proceeding in which he could actually raise the speedy trial
objection. The Court has since concluded that, unlike the double jeopardy guarantee, the speedy trial guarantee is merely a freedom from criminal liability because of an insufficiently speedy trial, and not a right to avoid going through a
stale prosecution. 219 Lower courts have accordingly refused to extend Braden
to allow pretrial federal habeas intervention when the defendant is already in a

judicial proceeding and can raise the speedy trial issue by defense in state
court. 220 Braden, therefore, only parallels the Younger exceptions for procedural

inadequacies, such as Gerstein, rather than those exceptions in which the harm
arises from simply having to go through the state court trial. By contrast, when

lower federal courts use pretrial habeas in the double jeopardy context, the harm
they redress is a substantive one: the undergoing of state court trial itself.22 '
Thus, even though an ongoing state proceeding may exist within which to raise
the double jeopardy issue by defense, the federal pretrial forum remains open.
Occasionally, the Court has intimated that pretrial habeas will lie when the
state crime charged is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. 222 But
the argument that the state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over a crime
typically has not, by itself, been enough to secure pretrial habeas. 223 A similar
result occurs in cases of pretrial habeas to abort military court martial proceedings for crimes over which the military arguably has no jurisdiction: litigants
need to show something more than a simple claim of no-power-to-proceed in the
court that is trying them. 224 These habeas decisions are analogous to decisions
219. See United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 859-61 (1978) (deciding appealability from
federal district court).
220. See, eg., Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1976); Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437
(3d Cir. 1975); see also Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial and the ExhaustionRequirement of Federal
Habeas Corpus, 1977 DUKE L.J. 707, 718-19 & nn.60-62 (discussing impact of Younger on pretrial
habeas).
221. See cases cited supra note 213.
222. See Royall, 117 U.S. at 253; see also Braden, 410 U.S. at 508 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(concluding that pretrial habeas was available when state court defendants asserted "lack ofjurisdiction, under the Supremacy Clause, for the State to bring any criminal charges against the petitioner"); In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372, 376-77 (1886) (upholding pretrial grant of writ in criminal
proceeding to state court defendant charged with perjury before notary public in disputed election of
member of Congress; defendant claimed exclusive federal court cognizance of crime).
223. See, e.g., New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89 (1894). In Eno, the president of a national bank,
charged in state court with forgery, claimed on pretrial federal habeas that the crime was exclusively
within the cognizance of the federal courts. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's grant of
the writ, observing that a bare defense of exclusive federal jurisdiction did not amount to special
circumstances under Royall for pretrial habeas. The federal defense could be raised in the state
courts and reviewed after the trial, either directly by the Supreme Court or collaterally in the lower
federal courts on postjudgment habeas. See id. at 96-97 (distinguishing In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372
(1886), discussed supra at note 222, as a case involving exigent circumstances).
224. Recently, the Court held that military courts have jurisdiction over crimes committed by
servicemen, whether or not they are service-related. See Solorio v. United States, 107 S.Ct. 2924
(1987). Prior to that decision the Court had held that criminal acts of persons who were no longer in
the service when charged were not "'service related offenses" within the meaning of the relevant
military court jurisdictional statute. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 1 (1955).
Civilians, therefore, succeeded on federal pretrial habeas in halting court martials that they claimed
lacked jurisdiction to try them for crimes they had previously committed while on active duty. Id.
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in the Anti-Injunction Act context, in which the Court has prevented private
litigants from shutting down state court proceedings that adjudicate matters
claimed to be within exclusive federal agency jurisdiction. 225 They are also
analogous to those cases refusing to carve out an exception to the Younger doctrine when the state court defendants argue that state regulatory power has been
22 6
preempted by federal law.
The parallel thinking behind the exceptions for pretrial habeas and the
The Court did not require them to raise the jurisdictional claim as a defense in the military court
proceeding.
Later, however, the Court denied pretrial injunctive relief to a defendant still in the military
who had made a substantial claim that his own crime was not service-related for other reasons, so
that the military courts had no jurisdiction to try him. See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738
(1975). The Court, expressly drawing support from the Younger doctrine of "Our Federalism,"
distinguished its earlier precedent. It explained that the rationale for immediate intervention in Toth
hinged on the jurisdictional objection being raised by a civilian rather than a serviceman. Id. at 75456, 759. Even if the military court, prior to Solorio, lacked jurisdiction over the serviceman, the
claim could be raised as a defense and through appeals within the military court system; ultimate
review would remain in an Article III court. 1d. The Councilman dissent argued that the federal
petitioners in both Toth and Councilman had" 'raised substantial arguments denying the right of the
military to try them at all,'" id. at 763 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 696 n.8 (1969)), and that immediate federal intervention was
proper in both cases in order to consider the jurisdictional question in advance. Id.
At some level every claim of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is an attack on the right of the
tribunal to proceed. But no-power-to-proceed defenses rarely have been the basis for immediate
collateral intervention into trial proceedings. See supranote 209; cf Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938) (exhaustion of administrative remedies required even though challenge
made to jurisdiction of agency). Certainly, the want of power in a court of limited jurisdiction,
particularly a military court that could provide only a "rough form ofjustice" in a setting that lacks
many civilian freedoms, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 35 (1957), presents a jurisdictional objection
warranting closer and more immediate scrutiny. By focusing on the civilian or noncivilian status of
the petitioner, the Court at least took into account the respective loss of personal liberties that would
be entailed in the absence of immediate intervention.
225. See Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511 (1955) (union's
effort to enjoin state court proceeding against its picketing barred by Anti-Injunction Act, despite
claim that National Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction over picketing); cf. HART
& WECHSLER, supra note 38, at 1250-51 n.8 (no-power-to-proceed arguments do not get around
§ 2283). However, a claim of federal agency jurisdictional exclusivity may sometimes be a basis for
stepped-up appealability under a liberalized reading of the final judgment statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(1982). See infra note 255. Also, when the United States or a federal agency seeks to vindicate the
exclusive jurisdiction of the agency over a matter that is pending in the state courts, it may be able to
do so by injunction. See supra note 139.
226. Compare Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Sachs, 802 F.2d 1527, 1532 (4th Cir. 1986) (Younger
applicable despite defense of federal agency preemption) and New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. City
of New Orleans, 798 F.2d 858, 863-64 (5th Cir. 1986) (same), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1910 (1987)
with Kentucky-W. Va. Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 791 F.2d 1111, 1116-17 (3d Cir.
1986) (Younger not applied when federal agency preemption is at issue) and Middle South Energy v.
Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 772 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1985) (same), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 884
(1986). The claim of federal agency preemption in these cases does implicate federal law enforcement and regulatory interests that tend to counterbalance ordinary comity concerns underlying
Younger. However, analogous arguments of an absence of state court subject matter jurisdiction
regularly have proved insufficient to deprive the state courts of the opportunity to decide that preemption question in the first instance. Even if preemption of the subject matter reflects congressional
doubt about state court parity in a particular area, the question whether state regulations are in fact
preempted is a separate issue that the state courts are presumably capable of answering as well. Cf
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983) (ordinary preemption
defense may be heard by state courts). Furthermore, rejection of the jurisdictional preemption defense may be a good candidate for accelerated direct review in the Supreme Court. See hifra note
255 (discussing Local 438, Constr. & Gen. Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963)). Of
course, the same reasons that make the preemption question immediately appealable apply to the
argument in support of prompt collateral intervention.

1987]

FEDERAL COURT INTER VENTION

framework for halting ongoing proceedings developed by Younger, the Anti-Injunction Act, and the civil rights removal statute suggests that relief under the
exceptions to these latter rules often will mirror relief under pretrial habeas. To
be sure, there are differences between injunctive relief and habeas. Habeas is
available only to persons in custody, and it supplies the exclusive remedy for
parties who seek release from or a shortening of their confinement. 227 Furthermore, habeas, unlike injunctive relief under section 1983, ordinarily would require exhaustion of state remedies. However, if pretrial habeas is available
because of the existence of special circumstances, there is necessarily no need to
further exhaust state remedies. The "special" circumstances for pretrial habeas
thus seem indistinguishable from the "exceptional" circumstances that allow for
injunctive relief against ongoing proceedings. As a result, the difference in outcomes between a suit for injunctive relief and pretrial habeas corpus should not
be significant.
VI.

FLEXIBLE FINALITY AND ACCELERATED SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF
STATE COURT JUDGMENTS

The extraordinary circumstances exceptions to the noninterference rules
considered thus far have dealt with immediate intervention by federal trial
courts. Congressional postponement of direct Supreme Court review of state
court decisions until the conclusion of state trial and appellate process serves a
similar goal of nonintervention into ongoing state judicial proceedings. 228 The
Supreme Court, however, has softened the seemingly unambiguous statutory requirement of a "final judgment" to allow it to grant review while state court
proceedings are still pending.22 9 The considerations that have moved the Court
to bend the clear-cut finality rule are roughly analogous to those that have
prompted it to allow immediate federal trial court intervention in the injunction,
pretrial habeas, and civil rights removal contexts.
A.

"Final"Decisions on CollateralFederal Questions

In Cox BroadcastingCorp. v. Cohn 230 the Court illustrated these considerations by marking out four categories of state court judgments it treated as final
even though state proceedings were not yet complete. 23 I The most intriguing
227. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). If parties in custody seek to attack the
length or fact of their confinement on constitutional grounds, habeas corpus, which ordinarily has an
exhaustion of state judicial remedies requirement, provides the sole remedy. The parties may not
immediately bring an injunction suit under § 1983 even if it otherwise would be available. Id.

228. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982) (limiting review of decisions from state courts to "[t]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had").
229. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (state court finality); cf.Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (relaxing requirement of federal district court
finality as prerequisite to review by federal appeals courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982)).
230. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
231. See id. at 477. The first three categories dealt with cases that (1) were completed as a
practical matter because the merits had been fully decided, (2) would necessarily turn on a federal
issue that had already been conclusively resolved, and (3) involved state procedural rules that would
have barred review later. Id. at 479-81; see also Note, The FinalityRule for Supreme CourtReview of
State Court Orders, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1004, 1012-14 (1978) (discussing Cox categories).
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and potentially expansive of the four Cox categories allows review of cases
before the conclusion of state court proceedings when the federal issue has been
finally decided by the state court system and when "a refusal immediately to
'2 32
review the state court decision might seriously erode federal policy."
The examples the Cox Court placed in this category constitute a curious
collection. In one of the cases, the Court had interfered with state trial court
proceedings that had temporarily enjoined labor picketing. Delaying review of
this decision, said the Court, "would seriously erode the national labor policy"
2 33
of having only the National Labor Relations Board initially hear such cases.
In another, pretrial intervention had been allowed to review a state court decision upholding venue over two national banks which claimed that a congressional statute prevented suit against them in the particular county in which they
had been sued. 234 The Court focused on the prospect that it might reverse on
the venue issue after subjecting the parties to litigation " 'which may all be for
nought.' "235 In its last example, which served as the model for Cox, a newspaper was sued for refusing to print a political candidate's reply to an editorial.
The newspaper had defended by urging the unconstitutionality of the statute
requiring it to carry the reply. After the state's highest court rejected that claim,
the Supreme Court granted immediate review because of the possible chill to the
press arising from the continued existence, pending trial, of an "unsettled" ques236
tion of the statute's constitutionality.
In each of these exemplar cases, rejection of the dispositive federal defense
by the state's highest court was coupled with an order of remand for trial, when
the defendants were prepared to raise viable nonfederal defenses that could have
mooted the federal issues. The cases thus express one of the traditional concerns
of the final judgment rule: the avoidance of irreparable harm pending litigation. 237 In a long line of cases, appellate review was allowed when lower federal
courts had ordered an immediate transfer of property, despite the fact that additional lower court proceedings still remained. The Supreme Court granted review in these cases because "irremediable injury" 23 8 might befall the property
232. Cox, 420 U.S. at 483.
233. Id. (discussing Local 438, Constr. & Gen. Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963)
(alternative holding)).
234. Id. at 483-84 (discussing Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963)).
235. Id. at 484 (quoting Mercantile, 371 U.S. at 558).
236. Id. at 484-86 (discussing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)).
237. For irreparable harm as a possible explanation of these cases, see Note, supra note 231, at
1026-32. See also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989, 997-98 (1987) (observing that finality
requirements should be construed so as not to cause irreparable injury); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 331 n.Il (1976) (same).
238. Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204 (1848). In Forgay the Court allowed immcdiate review of an interlocutory lower federal court order that transferred one party's property pending
the conclusion of the additional proceedings still remaining in the trial court. Although Chief Justice Taney's decision to allow an immediate appeal clearly turned on the avoidance of irreparable
harm, Forgay has traditionally been explained as a case involving practical finality-insofar as the
trial was completed and only an accounting of damages remained-rather than as a case involving
irreparable harm. See, e.g., Cox, 420 U.S. at 480; Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability
inthe FederalCourts, 75 Coi.uM. L. Riv. 89, 101 (1975). But see Comment, Reqtiem for the Fiuial
Judgment Rule, 45 Tix. L. Rav. 292, 298-300 (1966) (viewing Forgay as irreparable harm case).
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holder if review were delayed until the conclusion of the remaining proceedings,
and because the order transferring property was separable from any other
239
issues.
Some degree of irreparable harm was involved in each of the cases to which
the Cox decision referred. The newspaper freedom of speech case, as well as Cox
itself, involved "time-bound"' 24° rights that could have been lost by the chill that
would have arisen from continued litigation without federal intervention. The
labor union agency preemption case had analogs in the protection of action
under color of federal law from state interference though pretrial habeas relief.24 ' More importantly, in addition to the jurisdictional objection, that case
also involved the possible irreparable loss of a federally protected right to picket,
an interest akin to time-bound free speech interests. The national bank venue
defense case went much further than the others; no traditional irreparable harms
were present, even though the case arguably involved the protection of federal
242
instrumentalities in addition to the wrong-forum claim.
Perhaps more easily than it did in these cases, the Court recently held that a
239. See also Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 127 (1945) (upholding immediate review of order vacating transfer of radio operating license); Carondelet Canal & Navigation
Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U.S. 362, 373 (1914) (upholding immediate review of order commanding surrender of property to State, thereby disposing of federal rights).
240. See Note, supra note 231, at 1024-25.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 196-214.
242. In addition, in a series of cases since its decision in Cox, the Court has held that a state high
court's pretrial rejection of a constitutional due process defense of insufficient minimum contacts for
the exercise of personal jurisdiction can be immediately appealed as a final judgment. See, e.g.,
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 196 n.12 (1977); see also Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid, 86 S.
Ct. 1 (Goldberg, Circuit Justice 1965); cf.Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980) (allowing immediate appeal without discussion of issue); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980) (same). Like a rejected defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which is usually not
enough for immediate district court interference, see supra note 225, this defense involves a claim by
defendant that he has something akin to a right not to be tried, at least in a particular forum.
Although minimum contacts analysis may be driven in part by concerns of the judicial system, the
interest due process protects is primarily a personal one. See, e.g., Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985); Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 215-16. The defense is both a protection against having
to appear and defend in a distant and unfamiliar forum, and a freedom from such a forum's imposition of liability after trial.
Still, the harm of having to endure such proceedings can be mitigated to a large extent by
success at trial on the merits, by reversal of the jurisdictional holding, or by reversal of a judgment of
liability on subsequent appeal. Potentially unreviewable harm only arises in the unusual case in
which defendants who have unsuccessfully contested personal jurisdiction by a special appearance in
state court are then faced with the hard choice of having to waive objections to jurisdiction in order
to litigate the merits. Like the defendants facing the Young dilemma of choosing between a waiver of
rights or risking penalties, the Court has assisted these litigants through its flexible finality doctrine.
In Shaffer and Rosenblatt defendants objecting to personal jurisdiction were faced with the hard
choice of waiving their jurisdictional objection or facing a default judgment. In Rush and WorldWide Volkswagen, however, the Court took an immediate appeal without addressing the question of
finality. The hard-choice rationale probably explains why pretrial denials of motions to dismiss for
want of personal jurisdiction in the federal courts are not appealable of right under the collateral
order doctrine. See infra text accompanying note 245. See generally 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MIL.LER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1351, at 567-68 & n.40 (1969) (noting that denials of motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are not immediately appealable). Because the federal court system does not condition trial on the merits on waiver of personal jurisdiction defenses,
see FED. R. Civ. P. 12(g)-(h), federal defendants with minimum contacts defenses can litigate that
defense on appeal after trial. They do not face the same hard choice that a state court litigant might
face. Of those who unsuccessfully raise personal jurisdiction questions, therefore, it is arguably only
the hard-choice litigants who should be able to seek immediate Supreme Court review.
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conclusive state court rejection of a double jeopardy defense is immediately appealable under Cox, even though trial has not yet begun. 243 The Court's reason-

ing implicitly tracked the reasoning behind Younger's exceptional circumstances
doctrine as well as the justification for pretrial habeas, both of which also have

successfully accommodated intervention for double jeopardy claims. 244 Analogous concerns over irreparable harm have been expressed by the Court as the

basis for its "collateral order" doctrine governing appeals from the federal dis245
trict courts to the federal appellate courts.
B.

Constructively FinalDecisions

In each of the scenarios described in Cox, the Court interfered only after an
actual and conclusive decision of the state's highest court on the federal issue.
Nevertheless, the liberal finality rules also have been extended to interlocutory
orders and judgments of state trial courts that the state system has refused to
243. See Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 106 S. Ct. 1745, 1748 n.4 (1986).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82 & 213.
245. Under the Court's "collateral order" doctrine a party may appeal district court orders that
conclusively determine a particular issue which is separate from and collateral to the merits and is
effectively unreviewable on appeal later from a final decision. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374-75 (1981); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
The Court explained this last requirement as aimed at denials of rights that would be "destroyed if
not vindicated before trial." United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978). See also United
States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971) (collateral order appeal will lie only when "denial of immediate review would render impossible any review whatsoever").
As in the context of immediate collateral intervention and direct review of final judgments from
the state courts, the concern is that continued litigation and resort to ordinary appellate process
would work an injury and thus by definition could not provide an adequate forum to protect against
it. See Firestone Tire, 449 U.S. at 376 ("[T]he finality requirement should 'be construed so as not to
cause crucial collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered.' ") (quoting Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.ll (1976)); see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4
(1951) (pretrial denial of motion to reduce unconstitutionally excessive bail held immediately appealable, because right to be released during trial would be lost if vindicated only after appeal).
Other collateral order doctrine appeals have focused on defendants who claimed similar rights
not to "endure a trial." See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 743 (1982) (district court's
rejection of former President's defense of absolute immunity from civil damages in case seeking only
monetary relief); Heltoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 501 (1979) (congressman claiming absolute
immunity from criminal prosecution under the speech and debate clauses); Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 653 (1977) (defendants who lost motion to dismiss federal criminal proceeding on
double jeopardy grounds). Denials of ordinary dispositive federal defenses, on the other hand, have
not sufficed for immediate appellate intervention. Even though defendants in such cases would not
have to undergo trial should the appellate court reverse, they stand to suffer no more than the harms
that always attend good faith litigation.
Discovery and other interlocutory orders have rarely presented a compelling case for appellate
interference under Cohen. See, e.g., United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971); Cobbledick v.
United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940); cf.Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 122 (1951) (use of unconstitutionally seized evidence in state court not immediately enjoinable when "[n]o such irreparable
injury [is] clear and imminent"). Such orders typically do not involve unreviewable harms, even
though parties are in a Young-like dilemma of being forced to violate an order to get review of it.
But see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (holding denial of motion to quash subpoena for
presidential tapes to be final decision without requiring President to risk contempt). The rule is
different, and appealability is allowed, when the objections are to discovery of a nonparty. because
the nonparty cannot so readily be expected to risk contempt to test the discovery ruling and to
protect the rights of someone who is a party to the litigation. See Gravel v. United States. 408 U.S.
606, 608-09 n.1 (1972); Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 13 (1918). See generally Andr6, The
FinalJudgment Rule and Party Appeals of Civil Contempt Orders: Timne Fora Change, 55 N.Y.U.L.
R-v. 1041 (1980) (discussing differences in party versus nonparty appealability).
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review-once to let a Nazi demonstration go forward, 24 6 once to allow the press
access to a criminal trial, 247 and once to allow a drive-in theatre to continue
showing an allegedly obscene film.2 48 These cases were even less final than those

discussed in Cox. The state's appellate machinery had not yet ruled on the federal issue, because the state courts either could not or would not hear an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's pretrial ruling.
Each of these cases, however, also involved rulings that, unless reviewed
promptly, would have worked an immediate and irremediable loss of federally
protected rights. Thus, the state appellate system's inability or refusal to provide immediate review of a claimed injury to a time-bound federally protected
right effectively constituted a final decision allowing the-present injury to federal
an
interests to go unabated. In this sense, the state system's nonanswer was also 249
had."
be
could
decision
a
which
in
state
[the]
of
court
answer "by the highest
Although it may be difficult to see how the irreparable loss of a federal interest
would make an otherwise nonfinal judgment any more final, these cases show
that the presence of substantial irreparable harm can do just that. 250 These decisions, therefore, operate as judge-made equivalents in the state court system to
the statutory appeals available from federal trial courts on a grant or denial of
injunctive relief.

2 51

C. Asymmetries Between Immediate Supreme Court and
Trial Court Interference
The symmetry of immediate appellate and collateral intervention has been
less than perfect. The scope of liberalized finality as a vehicle for immediate
interference into ongoing state proceedings is somewhat broader than immediate
collateral intervention. Although most of the harms that would trigger intervention by way of injunction, civil rights removal, or pretrial habeas also would
246. See National Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977) (per curiam) (observing that separate issue of legality of state trial court's injunction against an imminent march
would have to be reviewed immediately, lest first amendment right to demonstrate be irretrievably
lost pending ordinary appellate process in state system).
247. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1319, 1325 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice 1975) (noting that valuable rights of press access might be lost pending completion of state court proceedings).
248. M.I.C., Ltd. v. Bedford Township, 463 U.S. 1341, 1342-43 (Brennan, Circuit Justice 1983).
249. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1972) (cited in Nebraska Press Ass'n, 423 U.S. at 1329).
250. According to one decision, for example,
Where... a direct prior restraint is imposed upon the reporting of news by the media,
each passing day may constitute a separate and cognizable infringement of the First
Amendment. The suppressed information grows older. Other events crowd upon it. To
this extent, any First Amendment infringement that occurs with each passing day is irreparable. By deferring action ... the Supreme Court of Nebraska has decided, and, so far as
the intervening days are concerned, has finally decided, that the restraint on the media will
persist. In this sense, delay itself is a final decision.
Id.
251. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1982) (allowing for immediate appeal from interlocutory orders
"granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions"). Congress has not provided a similar rule to govern the appeal of injunctive relief
or its denial in the state courts when such relief is based on federal law.
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warrant prompt appellate review after the state system had considered them, 252
the converse is not true. All of the harms the Court sought to prevent under
Cox probably would not warrant immediate federal trial court relief. The potential chill to free speech interests of third parties from continued state court litigation under an overbroad state law, which the Court focused on in Cox, was
offered and rejected as a ground for federal district court intervention in
Younger.253 The wrong-forum defenses of improper venue and agency preemption that Cox approved as candidates for immediate review would not, standing
254
alone, have provided a basis for removal, injunctive relief, or pretrial habeas.
Those examples involved interlocutory harms of somewhat less magnitude than
those for which district court intervention has been successfully invoked. Indeed, the more open avenue of direct review by the Supreme Court may be a
necessary safety valve to allow prompt federal input, given the restrictions on
255
immediate district court relief under similar circumstances.
The broader scope of intervention associated with liberalized finality makes
sense in terms of the competing interests at stake. The entire range of comity
and dispute resolution concerns is enormously reduced, although not eliminated,
when the state courts have conclusively reviewed the relevant federal issue, even
if only by interlocutory appeal. The interest in issue crystallization is satisfied
once the federal question has been resolved and self-corrective process actually
has been exhausted. Traditional equitable concerns such as the likelihood of
success on the merits and the magnitude of the harm are no doubt unspoken
factors in the Court's calculus in deciding questions of finality. 25 6 Yet it considers such cases at the expense of docket concerns to the extent that more litigants
increasingly will seek piecemeal review in hopes of coming under one of the Cox
categories.
In addition, there is at least one asymmetry that indicates the scope of accelerated direct review sometimes may be narrower than immediate district
court interference. In Flynt v. Ohio257 the Court denied an immediate appeal
from a state supreme court's conclusive rejection of an equal protection defense
of selective and discriminatory prosecution, calling the judgment below nonfinal.
Younger's exception permitting immediate federal court intervention to abort a
252. The obvious exception to this rule is Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619 (1981) (per curiam). See
infra text accompanying notes 257-59.
253. See supra note 44. Cox was a civil rather than a criminal case, thus arguably making federal court intervention less intrusive. See supra note 144.
254. See supra notes 8 (federal defense removal), 224 (military court jurisdiction, and pretrial
habeas and injunctive relief), 225 (exclusive federal agency jurisdiction and injunctions against state
courts), 242 (personal jurisdiction and appealability).
255. CompareAmalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511 (1955) (antiinjunction statute barred injunction sought by union against employer's state court lawsuit to stop
union's picketing, despite claims that jurisdiction over picketing was exclusively National Labor
Relations Board's and that time-bound rights could be lost absent prompt intervention) with Local
438, Constr. & Gen. Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963) (under similar facts, state court
order enjoining picketing held immediately appealable to Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(1982)).
256. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 238, at 101; cf. Leubsdorf, supra note 79, at 551-55 (noting
irreparability considerations that enter into traditional calculus for preliminary injunctive relief).
257. 451 U.S. 619 (1981) (per curiam).
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bad faith prosecution suggests that the right to be free from such a proceeding
would be irreparably lost in the absence of immediate interference. If the resolution of claims of discriminatory prosecution in violation of the equal protection
clause can await the outcome of litigation on the merits without being seriously
eroded, as claimed in Flynt, then either the Court was wrong in Younger when
it suggested the contrary, or it was wrong in Flynt where it made no reference to
the Younger bad faith analogy. 25 8 The decision should signal litigants to raise
bad faith issues in federal court before trial. This may even be an institutionally
preferable choice given the ease with which a federal trial court, in contrast to
the Supreme Court, can police fact-laden denials of federal rights. A similar
nonappealability rule in federal prosecutions faces defendants who raise a claim
of vindictive prosecution; 259 but they at least have had one federal forum in
260
which they could present the question.
VII.

CHOOSING AMONG OVERLAPPING MODES OF INTERVENTION:
COLLATERAL OR APPELLATE INTERFERENCE?

A.

The Dilemma in Choosing a FederalForum

Given that each of the exceptions to these noninterference rules makes a
similar inquiry into the adequacy of state court remedies, which way should
involuntary state court litigants turn, assuming they can show the exceptional
circumstances that give them a right to avoid further state proceedings? As
258. See D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 821 n.2 (3d ed. 1982).
259. See United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263 (1982) (per curiam) (denial of
motion to dismiss criminal charges based on prosecutorial vindictiveness in modifying indictment
after defendant's change of venue held not immediately appealable). As in Flynt, the Court in
Hollywood Motor Car failed to consider the Younger bad faith prosecution analogy.
260. Another "reverse" asymmetry was created by United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850,
857 (1978), in which the Court held that a denial of a motion to dismiss for want of a speedy trial
was not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The Court concluded that the
speedy trial right was merely one to be free from liability because of an insufficiently prompt trial,
and not, like double jeopardy, a guarantee not to undergo trial at all. Id. at 858-59. It also concluded that the prejudice from state court proceedings could not be assessed until after they had been
tried to a conclusion. Id. at 861. Previously, however, the Court had held that a party in state
custody could, through pretrial habeas, force the state to come to trial in a timely fashion or else
drop its charges. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973); see also supra text
accompanying notes 215-21 (comparing Braden with Younger). Thus, the Court had suggested that
the harm from the denial of the speedy trial can arise and be addressable not just after trial, but also
before.
Nevertheless, Braden, which allows pretrial intervention on the basis of speedy trial claims, can
be harmonized with MacDonald insofar as it focuses on the irreparable harm of continued, unreviewed detention in the absence of trial rather than the litigational harm of undergoing stale proceedings. This may explain why Braden-style pretrial habeas in federal court generally is unavailable to
those who seek a dismissal of pending state court proceedings. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. If litigants wish to make a successful speedy trial objection to a state prosecution on habeas
corpus, they must do so in advance of any state judicial proceedings, and they must couch their
claims as an attack on custody by affirmatively requesting prosecution. This scheme makes some
sense for persons already in state custody, who can be expected to make their colorable speedy trial
claim in federal court before trial. For them such a claim would seem less compelling if first raised
only after trial in state court has commenced. The scheme makes less sense for persons not yet in
custody who would have no real reason to want to push the state prosecution along. See Note, supra
note 220, at 710-15 & 720-24.
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noted previously, 26 1 there is substantial overlap in the availability and effect of
the various modes of collateral intervention. Although there are a few procedural and substantive quirks peculiar to civil rights removal and pretrial habeas,
the choice of relief through either of those two avenues-if available-or
through injunctive relief should not matter much. Their results are also the
same: each aborts the ongoing state proceedings.
A distinct and more troublesome set of issues is presented by the overlap
between immediate collateral relief in the district courts and immediate appellate interference by the Supreme Court under a liberalized final judgment rule.
The difficulty arises because circumstances presenting the possible irreparable
loss of federal rights that would warrant prompt federal trial court interference
can resemble the extraordinary circumstances under which the Court would be
prepared to find a final judgment under Cox, and so warrant prompt Supreme
Court interference. Indeed, the collateral nature of a present denial of federal
rights, which itself argues for finding a final judgment, also argues for finding an
independent federal violation over which a party may originally sue in federal
court.2 62 However, if a decision in the state court system can be considered
final, then, according to Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,263 direct Supreme Court
review may be the only proper mode of federal interference. Even assuming a
federal trial court had the jurisdictional power to hear the case, there also might
be preclusion problems at that point in allowing relitigation of issues already
2 64
passed upon by the state courts.
At the extremes, there may be no question as to which way litigants must
turn. If they have presented federal questions to the state courts and obtained a
conclusive answer to them-not just from the trial court, but from the state's
highest court, as in Cox-direct review is probably the only option even if trial
has yet to begin. At that point, the exclusivity of Supreme Court review makes
sense, even though a suit for injunctive relief, pretrial habeas, or civil rights
removal might have been available at the outset. 265 In addition, some claims of
irreparable harm, including those catalogued in Cox, may be cognizable in the
Supreme Court alone to the extent that the scope of the liberalized final judgment doctrine is broader than the scope of immediate trial court intervention.
Only if the litigant were in custody and thus able to seek habeas corpus, might
he resort to a federal district court without first having to exhaust avenues of
direct review by the Supreme Court. 266 In sharp contrast are parties who, prior
261. See supra text accompanying notes 135-46, 178-80 & 224-27.
262. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519, 1531 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
263. 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); see also District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462, 476 (1983) (holding lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to review final state court decisions); 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982) (giving Supreme Court power to review final judgments from state
courts).

264. See generally Currie,Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 317 (1978)
(discussing relationship between res judicata and finality).
265. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing injunctive relief to remedy double
jeopardy claims at pretrial stage); see also Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 106 S. Ct. 1745, 1748 n.4 (1986)
(allowing direct review of finally decided double jeopardy claim at pretrial stage).
266. A federal habeas applicant need not first seek Supreme Court review as a precondition to
federal relief. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435-36 (1963).
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to trial, have not yet presented to the state courts the federal issue that otherwise
warrants prompt intervention into the ongoing proceedings. They could hardly
be said to have secured any judgment, much less a final one.267 If immediate
federal relief is otherwise available, the district court will be their only federal
pretrial forum.
The hard questions arise when there has been a ruling in the state courts on
the federal issue that is less than conclusive. For example, instead of going directly to federal court, litigants with a ground for immediate interference into
the state proceedings, such as a double jeopardy defense, might present that issue in the state courts by pretrial motion. 268 They could, however, lose that
challenge, and interlocutory state court review might prove unavailable. Such
litigants then face a new dilemma. The unreviewed order arguably is a final
judgment requiring direct review. If irreparable harm is imminent-as it would
be, for example, in the double jeopardy context-the state courts' failure to review the trial court decision is tantamount to rejecting the claimed right to avoid
the harm.269 Even if the case were considered nonfinal for purposes of Supreme
Court review, there would remain problems with securing injunctive relief from
the district court. At that point federal plaintiffs would face a troublesome nonjurisdictional question of issue preclusion unless they were in custody and could
seek habeas corpus. 270 The obvious danger is that in allowing (or forcing) litigants to test even the quick-fix avenues of state court relief against proceedings
that would otherwise be enjoinable, they might lose the federal trial forum each
of these exceptional circumstances exceptions seems to make available.
Without discussion of the problem many federal courts, including the
Supreme Court in Younger, have sanctioned a pattern of limited state court ex27 1
haustion and federal court "relitigation," even outside the habeas context.
267. Until a state court decision is final for final judgment purposes, Rooker's limit on federal
trial court jurisdiction is not implicated. See Lynk v. LaPorte Superior Court No. 2, 789 F.2d 554,
564 (7th Cir. 1986) ("An essential strut beneath the [Rooker] policy is the existence of jurisdiction in
the Supreme Court .... "); see also infra note 287 and accompanying text (discussing Rooker).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 70-78 (suggesting that when litigants claim undergoing
of proceedings is a constitutional injury, preliminary resort to state court should not be required
under Younger). In civil cases still not covered by Younger and its progeny, such a preliminary
exhaustion requirement is doubtful when the federal court plaintiff invokes § 1983. See supra note
144-46 and accompanying text.
269. See, eg., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1327, 1329 (Blackmun, Circuit Justiace
1975) (not reaching issue whether similar irreparable harm can arise in cases not implicating free
speech).
270. Under the rule of Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 500 (1953), preclusion principles, discussed
infra at note 274, are not fully applicable to relitigation in federal court on habeas corpus.
271. In Younger the litigants initially had raised their first amendment claims by pretrial motion
in the state trial court and then sought, but were denied, interlocutory review in the state appellate
and supreme court. See 401 U.S. at 60 (Douglas, J., dissenting); cf. Willhauck v. Flanagan, 448 U.S.
1323, 1325 (Brennan, Circuit Justice 1980) (indicating that double jeopardy claim would merit exception to Younger doctrine "at least when all state remedies have been exhausted"); Traughber v.
Beauchane, 760 F.2d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 1985) (Wellford, J., concurring) (finding state remedies
inadequate for Younger purposes after state courts refused interlocutory appeal from trial court's
order of attachment, and only extraordinary appeal was then possible under state law). In Miofsky
v. Superior Court, 703 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1983), a defendant in a state court civil suit had sought
without success a protective order to restrain the disclosure of his psychiatric report on constitutional grounds. The district court concluded it had no jurisdiction over the state court defendant's
§ 1983 action seeking an injunction prohibiting disclosure of the confidential information. Id. at
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Other lower federal courts have avoided this dilemma simply by letting litigants
seek injunctive relief without first having to pursue pretrial avenues that might
be available in the ongoing state proceeding. Those litigants claiming to fall
within one of the exceptions to the noninterference rules generally have been
able to raise their federal claims immediately in federal court, even though there
might be a ready means to abort the state proceeding on those same grounds
within that state proceeding. The Court needs to confront this untidy issue.

B. The Desirability of Maintaining CollateralAvenues of Intervention
1. Pretrial Intervention
The conflict between immediate direct review and immediate collateral in-

tervention highlights two competing goals: Effective protection against irreparable harm to federal interests and a desire to have litigants make prompt use of

available state court pretrial remedies before seeking extraordinary federal intervention. These two goals can best be served if mere pretrial presentation of
the issue threatening immediate harm to the state trial court did not inevitably
lock the litigant into the direct review model. If it turns out that the state courts

cannot or will not provide a pretrial forum or an interlocutory appeal of an
adverse pretrial decision, the option to proceed in a federal trial court should
remain open. Otherwise, involuntary state court litigants would have to rely on
the uncertain chance of immediate Supreme Court assistance and lose their federal trial forum simply because they checked to see if state remedies were indeed
inadequate. 272 However, this wait-and-see approach might be difficult to implement without either modifying accepted preclusion rules or holding that, despite
the Rooker doctrine, some arguably final state court decisions are not subject to
exclusive Supreme Court jurisdiction.

Preclusion principles present a troublesome but not insurmountable barrier.

Under the full faith and credit statute, 273 federal courts must give preclusive

effect to state court decisions, including not-yet-reviewed decisions, if a state
court would give that decision preclusive effect. 274 One solution, therefore,
334. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that federal
jurisdiction could attach once the state appellate courts had refused review. Id. at 334-35. There
was no discussion of Rooker in this case.
272. See also University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 106 S. Ct. 3220, 3221-22 (1986) (holding unreviewed
state agency fact findings can have preclusive effect in subsequent action under § 1983); Parsons
Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 58 (1986) (federal court injunction under exception to antisuit
injunction statute to halt relitigation in state court of matters previously decided by federal court
may have to come before, not after, state trial court has resolved preclusion question); Migra v.
Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 80-87 (1984) (preclusion can bar subsequent
§ 1983 suit in federal court when federal plaintiff might have, but did not raise § 1983 claim in
connection with prior successful state court breach of contract suit); Kremer v. Chemical Constr.
Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982) (pursuing state court appeal of state agency decision can have preclusive
effect in federal court action under Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)
(1982)). In each of these cases the litigant could have avoided the preclusive effect of the state
tribunal's decision only by never having invoked the initial state remedy in the first place.
273. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
274. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 465 (1982) (claim preclusion);
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 99 (1980) (issue preclusion). In Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala.
Bank, 474 U.S. 518 (1986), the Court held that a federal court must give the same preclusive effect to
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would be to fashion an exception to this usual rule. Even if the state court
would give decisions such preclusive effect, federal courts could treat pretrial
decisions of state trial courts on an issue threatening immediate harm to federal
rights as not having preclusive effect, at least when pretrial federal intervention
275
otherwise would have been warranted.
A more uncertain barrier is the jurisdictional one. When a decision is final
for direct review purposes, the final judgment statute does not seem to give litigants an option of choosing between Supreme Court and federal district court
intervention. 276 An alternative and perhaps additional solution would be to limit
the Rooker doctrine. The Court could allow some flexibility to litigants in the
irreparable harm context when their case is "final" only because the state courts
cannot or will not review a pretrial decision threatening irreparable harm. A
litigant facing the extraordinary circumstance of immediate loss of a federally
protected interest in the pretrial context arguably should be able to opt for either
the collateral avenues of interference or the route of flexible finality.277 It is
difficult to imagine that, in the Court's desire to reach out and help such litigants
in extraordinary circumstances who sought assistance under Cox's liberalization
of the finality doctrine, the Court meant to close down collateral avenues and set
up its own rather dramatic remedy as the exclusive one. Also, the Rooker doctrine loses much of its force when existing state appellate remedies are inadequate. 278 Federal court interference then more strongly resembles mere
relitigation, a nonjurisidictional hurdle, than review of a final state court decision that only the Supreme Court has power to hear.
To be sure, a number of general considerations favor the exclusive direct
review model, even apart from the argument that it is compelled by the final
judgment statute. Exclusive direct review is the most respectful and conclusive
means of reviewing federal questions 279 and was the preferred model for doing
so for nearly a century. It is usually less intrusive than collateral intervention
an unreviewed, but reviewable, state court decision that the state courts would give it. Of course, not
all states might give preclusive effect to reviewable but unreviewed decisions of their own trial courts,
but that would not necessarily prevent the federal courts from giving them such effect. See Migra v.
Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 88 (White, J., concurring).
275. See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1983) (although ordinary preclusion principles
apply in § 1983 suits, "[a]dditional exceptions to collateral estoppel may be warranted in § 1983
actions in light of the 'understanding of § 1983' that 'the federal courts could step in where the state
courts were unable or unwilling to protect federal rights' ") (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,
107 (1980)).
276. The final judgment statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982), provides that "[final judgments or
decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed in
the Supreme Court .... " In District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983), the Supreme Court stated that the statute meant that "[r]eview of [final] determinations can
be obtained only in this Court." Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
277. Cf. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 38, at 629 ("[I]s there sufficient reason why, if the
question of finality is in doubt, the litigant should not be given the option of choosing his time?").
278. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414 (1923), involved an attempt to relitigate a
question that had been conclusively passed upon by the state supreme court. District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983), involved a similar attempt to review a
decision of the District of Columbia's highest court.
279. Congress provided for direct review in the first Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25,
1 Stat. 73. Habeas corpus for state prisoners, civil rights removal, general federal question jurisdiction, and liability for deprivations of federally protected rights inflicted under color of state law were
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insofar as it tends to occur only after the contest in state court is completed.
Direct review also gives the Supreme Court the exclusive power in each case to
decide when federal interference with state courts should take place, if at all.
Federal interference would be magnified if such questions could be presented to
the more readily accessible and numerous district courts.
Nevertheless, in the interlocutory context, direct review may be a more extraordinary vehicle than collateral intervention for policing ongoing irreparable
harms to federal rights. First, enlisting the aid of the Supreme Court as opposed
to the federal district courts is a much costlier use of federal judicial resources,
not to mention the resources of the parties and their attorneys. Further, the
ambiguity inherent in the determination of when a trial court decision becomes a
final judgment encourages resort to additional protective filings with the
Supreme Court. 280 In addition, some harms for which the Court is prepared to
allow immediate intervention into ongoing state proceedings require factual inquiries that a reviewing court is less equipped to perform than a trial court. The
often discretionary nature of final judgment review makes the Supreme Court a
less than certain protection. Finally, pulling up cases from the state court system in order to stay interlocutory state court decisions enables a single Justice,
rather than the whole Court, to pass on questions of irreparability and the adequacy of state remedies. 2 81 The extraordinary day-to-day task of riding herd on
a state court appellate system might be less onerous and no more intrusive if
performed by the local federal district judge.
Immediate collateral interference, moreover, is only a slightly greater intrusion than the Supreme Court interference called for by a greatly liberalized concept of finality. Intervention under Cox, like collateral intervention, comes
before the state contest is completely over, and in some cases before it has barely
begun. When a federal court interferes with unreviewed interlocutory orders of
state trial courts, the push against comity concerns is the same whether it is the
Supreme Court or the federal district court doing the interfering. Under the
direct review model, even after the state courts have finished with the case, there
may yet remain a second round of Supreme Court review to decide the merits. 282 Therefore, mere pretrial presentation and resolution of dispositive federal
statutorily enacted all within a decade of the conclusion of the Civil War. See Wiecek, The Recolstruction of FederalJudicial Power, 13 Am.J. LEGAL HIsT. 333, 336-57 (1969).
280. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 512 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 38, at 629.

281. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f) (1982), a single Justice can stay a "final judgment" from a state
court that would be subject to direct review. See R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE 679-80 (6th ed. 1986). Only in National Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432
U.S. 43 (1977), did the entire Court, in a short per curiam opinion, render a recent decision on the
appealability of trial court orders. See also Sup. CT. R. 43.6 (allowing individual Justice to refer
applications for stay to entire Court).
282. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1319 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice 1975) illustrates
the problem. On petitioner's first request to stay a trial court's order barring press access to a state
criminal trial, a stay was "neither issue[d] nor finally den[ied]." Id. at 1324-25. Instead, Justice
Blackmun invited petitioners to return to the Supreme Court if interlocutory review in the state
supreme court was not promptly forthcoming. Id. One week later, relief was again requested when
it looked as though the state supreme court would not hear the case for a few more weeks. A partial
stay was granted of the "final" trial court order that had barred the press from the state court
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issues in the state courts which otherwise would provide a basis for federal trial
court intervention should not automatically foreclose district court interference.
2.

Intervention During Trial or After Judgment

Irreparable harms arising during trial or after judgment, and not susceptible to pretrial challenge, should counsel greater hesitation in allowing federal
district court intervention as a companion to Supreme Court relief. In these
cases, comity concerns are intensified because the state courts already may have
invested substantial resources in the suit, even though it is not yet concluded.
Federal interference in the middle of litigation, therefore, may be more intrusive
than intervention at the beginning or end of a trial. In addition, as a state court
decision more closely approximates traditional finality, it comes within the exclusive gravitational pull of direct Supreme Court review. Thus, if the state appellate system will allow for an expeditious challenge to a lower state court's
mid-trial or posttrial ruling threatening irreparable harm, the involuntary litigant ought not have the same luxury either to bypass state process altogether or
to try out state process without an inevitable loss of the federal trial forum.
Even if the state appellate remedy is not sufficiently prompt, interim Supreme
Court aid may be available so that the litigant can pursue a meaningful appeal of
the lower state court's rulings through the state system, and so that the Court
283
can preserve its own ultimate jurisdiction on direct review.
Nevertheless, a claim sometimes may be raised in the middle of litigation,
or as a consequence of trial court judgment, that attacks on constitutional
grounds state procedural roadblocks to further state court review. That, essentially, was the nature of the claim recently raised in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,
1nC. 2 8 4 In that case, the federal plaintiff complained that the application of state
bond-posting and lien provisions posed a constitutionally impermissible barrier
to its exercise of a state-granted right to appeal the judgment on the merits. If
irreparable harm285 would arise out of such unforeseeable procedural barriers
and if the federal trial court finds that further state court procedural mechanisms for challenging the barriers are clearly unavailable, the constitutional
claim should be raisable immediately in federal court even though a nonintercriminal trial. Id. at 1327, 1328-29. Later the Supreme Court ruled on the merits. See Nebraska

Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
283. Under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982), federal courts may grant injunctive relief

in aid of their jurisdiction. Bui cf.R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, supra note 281, at 679
(suggesting that 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f) (1982), which requires a "'finaljudgment" from state court, is
sole vehicle by which a single Justice or Court can grant stay of state court proceedings in order to
preserve appellate review).
284. 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987). The federal plaintiff, Texaco, never submitted to the state courts the
question of the constitutionality of the bond-posting and lien statutes as applied to it,
but instead
went directly to federal court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded
that the futility associated with seeking bond reduction in the state court system obviated any need
to resort to the state courts initially, even assuming Texaco ordinarily would have had to do so. See
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1145-46 (2d Cir. 1986).
285. Texaco claimed that the bond requirement would cause it to go into bankruptcy. Cf.Doran
v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930 (1975) (concluding that threat of bankruptcy presented
grounds for equitable intervention when Younger not triggered because there vas no pending state
proceeding).
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vention principle such as Younger might apply in such a case. 286 Both Rooker

and preclusion questions are less seriously implicated in such cases to the extent
the federal court does not seek to review any "decision" of the state trial court at
28 7
all, but instead decides the federal question in the first instance.

In close cases in which the availability of state court relief is uncertain, it
might be preferable to avoid the all-or-nothing approach of Supreme Court versus lower federal court intervention. In cases falling within this "twilight zone"
of finality,2 88 the district courts might be given jurisdiction until it is certain

that the judgment really is final and, therefore, subject to exclusive Supreme
Court review. Federal district courts could thus share with the Supreme Court
the initial task of entering interim injunctive relief when needed. If state courts
then provide a vehicle to raise the federal issues and actually render a decision

on them, direct review from the state court decision under Cox might be appropriate. Absent a prompt answer from the state court, however, the lower federal

court could continue its injunctive relief and, if necessary, decide the federal
89
2
questions on its own.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps it is not so remarkable after all that the exceptions to the various
judge-made and statutory noninterference rules so closely resemble each other.
286. In Pennzoil the Court concluded that such procedures were not clearly lacking. 107 S. Ct.
at 1527-28. The Court, however, only obliquely indicated the direction in which Texaco should turn
if the state court avenues were lacking, or if the state courts decided against Texaco on the constitutional question. The Court noted that "[i]f, and when, the Texas courts render a final decision on
any federal issue presented by this litigation, review may be sought in this Court in the customary
manner." Id. at 1529.
287. See id. at 1529-30 (Scalia, J.,
joined by O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding no jurisdictional
bar under Rooker to Texaco's federal suit); id. at 1531 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in judgment) (same);
id. at 1533-34 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in judgment) (same); id. at 1535-36 n.3 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment) (same). But see id. at 1533 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in judgment) (Rooker should
have barred suit).
288. The term "twilight zone" comes from Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Gillespie v.
United States Steel, 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964).
289. See, e.g., Lynk v. LaPorte Superior Court No. 2, 789 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1986). In Lynk the
federal plaintiff claimed in a suit brought under § 1983 that procedural roadblocks arising in the
middle of his state court divorce proceeding unconstitutionally prevented him from obtaining a divorce. Id. at 568-69. The divorce proceeding was active, but going nowhere, when he unsuccessfully sought federal district court relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
which assumed that Younger applied, ordered the district court to take jurisdiction over the case,
Rooker notwithstanding, in order to let the federal plaintiff explore whether he had any state remedies available in the ongoing proceeding through which he might raise his constitutional challenge.
Id. The appellate court in Lynk observed that an actual conclusion on the merits of the constitutional issue by the state courts would be reviewable in the Supreme Court. If, on the other hand, the
state courts refused to consider the federal question, the federal plaintiff was invited back to district
court to press his constitutional claim. Id. at 569. Cf.Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 502
(1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (concluding that although abstention was called for, the district court
"should have retained jurisdiction for the purpose of affording.., appropriate relief in the event that
the state prosecution did not go forward in a prompt and bona fide manner"); Baines v. City of
Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 593-94 (4th Cir. 1964) (district court could preserve status quo pending
decision whether permanent injunction should issue in face of Anti-Injunction Act), aff'd, 384 U.S.
890 (1966); Allen v. Johnston, 575 F. Supp. 935, 938-39 (S.D. Iowa 1983) (granting temporary
injunction in § 1983 case against ongoing state court criminal proceeding claimed to violate double
jeopardy clause, so that state court defendant could test avenues of immediate direct review within
state court system).
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Each exists in order to protect against the immediate and irreparable loss of
federally protected rights, although they remain as consistent as possible with
the principle of nonintervention in ongoing state proceedings. More surprising
is the reluctance of most courts to acknowledge the overlap and the problems
that arise from it.
It is also disconcerting that the Court tends not to distinguish between
judge-made and congressional noninterference principles in its development of a
general common law of federal court noninterference. The Court has, at different times, placed a judicial gloss requiring nonintervention onto Reconstructionera statutes such as the 1871 Civil Rights Act, the 1866 Civil Rights Removal
Statute, and the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act, all of which arguably opened up access to federal courts without regard to the existence of state remedies. Yet it
also has placed inverse glosses to allow for intervention in exceptional circumstances under the Anti-Injunction Act and the final judgment statute, both of
which seem flatly to disallow it.
Nevertheless, by each of these unrelated actions the Court has brought
some consistency of treatment to a statutory framework that sometimes seems to
point in inconsistent directions. In the process, the Court has fashioned a minimalist role for federal court intervention into ongoing state proceedings whenever the state courts are inadequate to the task of protecting federal rights.
Although locating the common ground and the conflicts among the exceptions to the various noninterference rules may aid in discovering a rationale for
immediate intervention under the Court's current doctrines, it still leaves other
important questions unresolved. A "right not to be tried" is a convenient label
the Court can apply to a particular interest it wants to protect by prompt federal
intervention. Yet it is not always easy to predict when the Court will conclude
that some interests, such as those protected by the double jeopardy prohibition,
inevitably will be lost by the undergoing of trial, while others, such as that protected by the speedy trial guarantee, will not. Nor is it easy to predict when a
particular interest, other than a substantive immunity from litigation, will be
irreparably harmed as a consequence of procedural deficiencies in the state court
proceedings.
The Court has provided some guidance, however, on these questions. Because adequacy of remedy and irreparability questions go hand-in-hand, the
Court's adequacy inquiry in the various noninterference contexts bears a strong
resemblance to the traditional calculus for allowing preliminary injunctive relief.290 In addition, the Court has thrown off its usual state court deference
principles in a number of areas when the federal government or its actors have
been involved. This, however, probably has less to do with doubts about state
court parity than it does with a particular countervailing interest in federal
290. See generally Leubsdorf,supranote 79, at 544-48. The traditional equitable criteria, particularly the likelihood of ultimate success on the merits, and the requirement of irreparable harm if no
relief is granted in the interim, all help to answer the basic question, familiar to procedural due
process, whether judicial process is needed before or only after a particular harm. Id.
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supremacy and federal law enforcement that trumps the federalism-based reasons for deference to the state courts in the first place.
Finally, the justification for intervention offered here has assumed, as the
Court has steadfastly maintained, that state courts are ordinarily as competent
as federal courts at dealing with federal rights in the first instance. This presumption of parity may be doubtful as a reflection of litigational reality. Moreover, some of the exceptional circumstances that allow for prompt intervention
are in open conflict with the ideal of parity. At present, federal courts must
assess the adequacy of state court remedies when asked to do so under any of
these exceptional circumstances doctrines. This, too, is interference, but the adequacy inquiry is made only at the fringe. In these exceptional circumstances
cases the concept of state court inadequacy is a fairly narrow one.
Without the categorical presumption of parity, however, the balance of efficient dispute resolution and accuracy interests would be laid open in each case,
even when exceptional circumstances are not alleged. Federal courts then would
be called upon to assess the practical ability of the state court to handle the
particular federal issue with which it has been presented. 291 Quite apart from
any supposed insult to the state judiciary in assessing its ability to handle federal
issues, such a case-by-case inquiry would consume substantial federal judicial
resources in advance of trial. The modest degree of predictability as to when
interests of the judicial system would tip the scale in favor of immediate intervention would be lost if Congress' aged statutes were read to demand such an
assessment in every case.2 92 Of course, none of these problems would occur if
the Court read Congress' statutes always to open the federal courts without regard to available state remedies, but that reading has its own costs and seems to
have fallen on deaf ears.
Thus, even if the parity presumption inaccurately reflects litigational reality, or Congress' own assumptions, the primary harm that it inflicts on state
court defendants is in forcing them to endure the cost of good faith proceedings
in state court and the chance of enduring, maybe only temporarily, an erroneous
decision. Most litigants are not in danger of immediate loss of federally protected rights pending such litigation. Those who face such a danger usually can
argue an exception to one of the various noninterference rules. Moreover, it is
unlikely that the Court intends any time soon to reverse its long-standing views
on the competence of.state courts to resolve federal issues. Perhaps the most
federal litigants realistically can expect is for the Court to give sensitive treatment to the prospects for immediate intervention under exceptions to its wellentrenched noninterference rules, coupled with an approach that accepts parity
as its first principle.

291. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961) (federal courts will not assess adequacy of
state court remedies in litigation brought under § 1983), overruled in part onl othergrounds by Monell
v. New York City Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
292. A respectable argument suggests that this is precisely what Congress may have intended by
its Reconstruction jurisdictional statutes. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 16, at 828-42; Redish,
supra note 13, at 483-84; Weinberg, supra note 126, at 1197-99.

